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FRAMING A TEST CONSISTENT WITH
PRECEDENT AND ORIGINAL MEANING
I. Introduction
The evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine over the past
century bears a striking resemblance to Hamlet’s descent into in-
sanity. Step by step, faced by increasingly sophisticated technologies,
the Court has crafted rules, exceptions, and exceptions to the excep-
tions, until we find ourselves in an incoherent world that bears little
relationship to the original rights it encompasses.
The Founders introduced the Fourth Amendment to secure lib-
erty.1 The clause reinforced the right of the people, as sovereign, to
determine the conditions under which the government could intrude
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in their lives.2 The interests at stake went well beyond the physical
world. As Justice Brandeis famously observed in his dissent inOlmstead
v United States, the Framers “sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.”3 Any in-
trusion had to be justified. For that, a general warrant would be insuf-
ficient. Even a particularized one had tomeet the requirements in the
second part of the clause: probable cause demonstrated to an inde-
pendent magistrate, supported by oath or affirmation, and “particu-
larly describing the places to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.”4 Outside of these conditions, or a known felon in flight,
the Fourth Amendment created an absolute bar.5 It was not, as the
Court suggested in 1948 and repeated seventy years later inCarpenter
v United States, an effort “to place obstacles in the way of a too per-
meating police surveillance.”6 It was government surveillance of the
privacies of life itself that was forbidden, outside of constitutional
strictures.7
For decades, the Court adopted a property-based approach, tying
the doctrine to common-law trespass, which prioritized the question
of whether a physical intrusion had occurred “on a constitutionally
protected area.”8When confronted with its first wiretapping case, the
Court’s failure was not in recognizing that telephone wires lay out-
side the home, which they clearly do, but in failing to recognize that
through wiretapping, the government gained access to the intimate
details of the speakers’ lives—details ensconced in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects.
2 Camara v Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 US 523, 528 (1967); Boyd
v United States, 116 US 616, 630 (1886). See also Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’
Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 Minn L Rev
1325, 1326 (2002).
3 Olmstead v United States, 277 US 438, 476 (1928) (Brandeis, J, dissenting).
4 US Const, Amend IV.
5 Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U Chi L Rev 1181 (2016). See
also Carpenter v United States, 138 S Ct 2206, 2243 (2018) (Thomas, J, dissenting).
6 United States v Di Re, 332 US 581, 595 (1948); Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2214 (majority);
Camara, 3887 US at 528, quoted in Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2213.
7 See Segura v United States, 468 US 796, 810 (1984) (“But the home is sacred in Fourth
Amendment terms not primarily because of the occupants’ possessory interests in the premises,
but because of their privacy interests in the activities that take place within.”).
8 See United States v Jones, 565 US 400, 405, 406 n 3 (2012); Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2213.
See also Kyllo v United States, 533 US 27, 34–35 (2001); Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2236 (Thomas,
J, dissenting).
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In 1967,Katz vUnited States did nothing to address this deficiency.9
Instead, it took the doctrine further from its original purpose, placing
it in a make-believe land of relativistic determinations.10 If there is a
silver lining to be taken from theCourt’s recent decision inCarpenter,
it is thatmultiple Justices acknowledged the problems created byKatz
and its progeny.11 Justice Thomas launched a devastating attack on
the earlier decision, stating, “The Katz test has no basis in the text or
history of the FourthAmendment.”12His complaints are well-founded.
Not only is the test from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz in-
consistent with the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment, but as
a matter of constitutional pluralism, it has proven deeply problematic.
If, as the Court stated in 2006, “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’”13 then it falls to judges tomake the call
of what is “more” or “less” reasonable. This puts them squarely in the
realmof policy-making, risking public confidence in theworkings of the
Court.14 In the decades that followedKatz, theCourt repeatedly ignored
societal standards, substituting its own judgment for that of elected
representatives and narrowing protections afforded to the people.15The
9 Katz v United States, 389 US 347 (1967).
10 See Randy E. Barnett and Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of
Originalism, 107 Georgetown L J 1 (2018) (arguing that originalist constitutional construc-
tion should be informed by the original function or purpose of the relevant provision).
11 See Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2236 (Thomas, J, dissenting); id at 2261–65 (Gorsuch, J,
dissenting). See also Minnesota v Carter, 525 US 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J, concurring).
12 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2236 (Thomas, J, dissenting). See also id at 2238–45 (discussing
many ways in which Katz departed from the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
13 Brigham City v Stuart, 547 US 398, 403 (2006).
14 See Carpenter, 138 S Ct. at 2236 (Thomas, J, dissenting) (arguing that Katz “invites
courts to make judgments about policy, not law.”); id at 2264 (the right to bring a claim does
not “depend on whether a judge happens to agree that your subjective expectation to privacy
is a ‘reasonable’ one.”); id at 2265 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting) (“When judges abandon legal
judgment for political will . . . [we] risk undermining public confidence in the courts them-
selves.”); id (“Deciding what privacy interests should be recognized often calls for a pure policy
choice . . . which calls for the exercise of raw political will belonging to legislatures, not the
legal judgment proper to courts.”).
15 In California v Ciraola, the Court held there is no “reasonable expectation of privacy” in
an enclosed yard, as even fences “might not shield [marijuana plants] from the eyes of a
citizen or a policeman perched on the top of a truck or a two-level bus,” despite state laws
making it illegal to ride on top of a truck, trespass on others’ property, or climb fences
without the owner’s consent. See California v Ciraolo, 476 US 207, 209, 214 (1986); 1981 Cal
Stat 3149, 3155, codified at Cal Veh Code § 21712 (adding Subsection (b), stating that “No
person shall ride on any vehicle or upon any portion thereof not designed or intended for the
use of passengers,”); 1982 Cal Stat 4709, codified at Cal Veh Code § 23116 (passed Sept 22,
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result is a doctrine that is much maligned for logical fallacies, in-
consistency, and unmanageability.16
Along the way, the judiciary carved out broad exceptions, foremost
amongst which is the third-party doctrine. In Katz, Justice White
presaged its evolution, arguing that knowingly exposing information
to others implies an assumption of risk that the other party may later
disgorge it.17 For him, the Fourth Amendment had nothing to say
about unreliable associates.Drawing an analogy to informant doctrine,
1982, making it illegal for a minor to be in the back of a flatbed truck); 1961 Cal Stat 2919,
codified at Cal Penal Code § 602.5 (unauthorized entry of property); 1981 Cal Stat 980, 988,
codified at Cal Penal Code § 602 (trespass upon fenced, cultivated land). This last provision is
reflected in numerous local ordinances. See, for example, Orange County, California, County
Code § 3-8-24. In United States v Dunn, the Court determined that it was “reasonable” for a
Drug Enforcement Agency agent to cross a perimeter fence, an interior fence, and a barbed
wire fence, to peer inside a barn that was located on private property a half mile from any
road, before crossing another barbed wire fence and a wooden fence to look inside a second
structure. See United States v Dunn, 480 US 294, 297 (1987). The Court ignored state and
federal judicial decisions that considered barns to be within the curtilage. See, for example,
Luman v State, 629 P2d 1275, 1276 (Okla Crim App 1981); United States v Berrong, 712 F2d
1370, 1374 (11th Cir 1983); Rosencranz v United States, 356 F2d 310, 313 (1st Cir 1966);
Walker v United States, 225 F3d 447; United States v Swann, 377 F Supp 1305, 1306 (Md
1974); United States v King, 305 F Supp 630, 634 (ND Miss 1969), and dozens of further cases
cited in Dunn, 480 US at 308–9 (Brennan, J, dissenting). It also ignored state law making it
illegal to trespass on private property if given notice. See Tex Penal Code Ann § 30.05 (1980).
In California v Greenwood, the Court decided that it was not “reasonable” to consider garbage
within the Fourth Amendment on the grounds that bags left out on the curb are “readily ac-
cessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public,” despite
local ordinances making it illegal for anyone to go through peoples’ garbage. See California v
Greenwood, 486 US 35 (1988); California, Laguna Beach, Municipal Code § 7.16.060(b).
16 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2244 (Thomas, J, dissenting). Scholars are scathing in their crit-
icism. See, for example, Daniel J. Solove, Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff Between Privacy
and Security (Yale, 2011); Amitai Etzioni, A Cyber Age Privacy Doctrine: More Coherent, Less
Subjective, and Operational, 80 Brooklyn L Rev 1263 (2015); Steven M. Bellovin et al, When
Enough Is Enough: Location Tracking, Mosaic Theory, and Machine Learning, 8 NYU J L &
Liberty 556 (2014); David Gray and Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy,
98 Minn L Rev 62, 70 (2013); Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy,
81 Miss L J 1309 (2012); Andrew William Bagley, Don’t Be Evil: The Fourth Amendment in the
Age of Google, National Security, and Digital Papers and Effects, 21 Albany L J Sci & Tech 153
(2011); Priscilla J. Smith et al, When Machines Are Watching: How Warrantless Use of GPS
Surveillance Technology Violates the Fourth Amendment Right Against Unreasonable Searches, 121
Yale L J Online 177, 177 (2011); John J. Brogan, Facing the Music: The Dubious Constitu-
tionality of Facial Recognition, 25 Hastings Comm & Ent L J 65, 73 (2002); Ku, 86 Minn L Rev
at 1327 (cited in note 2); Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment:
Seeing Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 Minn L Rev 1393 (2002);
Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S Cal L Rev
1083 (2002).
17 Katz, 389 US at 363 n ∗∗ (1967) (White, J, concurring) (“When one man speaks to
another he takes all the risks ordinarily inherent in so doing, including the risk that the man
to whom he speaks will make public what he has heard. The Fourth Amendment does not
protect against unreliable . . . associates.”).
350 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW [2018
the Court subsequently decided that anything you tell anyone else—
even if necessary for the day-to-day running of a household or living in
the modern world—does not fall within the protections of the Fourth
Amendment. Miller v United States and Smith v Maryland dealt, re-
spectively, with banking and telephone records.18 But the rule quickly
expanded to encapsulate almost any record entrusted to others.
Intellectually diverse scholars have roundly denounced third-party
doctrine.19 Professor Wayne LaFave declared Miller “dead wrong,”
“a mockery of the Fourth Amendment.”20 Professor Daniel Solove
considered it “one of the most serious threats to privacy in the digital
age.”21 Professor Randy Barnett has called for “[b]oth the third-party
doctrine of Smith and the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ ap-
proach of Katz . . . to be adapted to modern circumstances.”22 As
Justice Gorsuch observed in Carpenter, the exception eviscerated
Fourth Amendment doctrine, leaving it unprepared for the modern
age: “Even ourmost private documents—those that, in other eras, we
would have locked safely in a desk drawer or destroyed—now reside
on third party servers.”23 It is ludicrous to think that these documents
are not private.
Nowwe have, withCarpenter, an exception to the exception, saying
that location data are, well, special and that other things might be
special too, but we can’t say right now just what falls into that camp.24
This article observes that while the Court had little choice but to
grant certiorari and to find location data protected under the Fourth
18 Smith v Maryland, 442 US 735, 745 (1979); United States v Miller, 425 US 435, 443
(1976).
19 See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 Mich L Rev 561, 563 n 5
(2009) (observing that “[a] list of every article or book that has criticized the doctrine would
make . . . the world’s longest law review footnote”).
20 Wayne R. LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 2.7(c) at
747 (Thomson West, 4th ed 2004), cited and quoted in Kerr, 107 Mich L Rev at 564 (cited in
note 19).
21 Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for
Judicial Deference, 74 Fordham L Rev 747, 753 (2005), cited and quoted in Kerr, 107 Mich L
Rev at 564 n 10 (cited in note 19). See also Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2264 (Gorsuch, J, dis-
senting).
22 Randy E. Barnett, Why the NSA Data Seizures Are Unconstitutional, 38 Harv J L & Pub
Pol 3, 16 (2015).
23 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2262 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting) (writing that Miller and Smith
proved “[a] doubtful application of Katz that lets the government search almost whatever it
wants whenever it wants.”).
24 See id at 2217, 2223 (majority).
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Amendment, the reasoning it adopted exacerbated doctrinal weak-
nesses and created profound challenges for judiciary going forward.
The CarpenterCourt held that warrantless access to seven or more
days of cell site location information (CSLI) constitutes a violation of
the reasonable expectation of privacy that individuals have in the
whole of their physical movements.25 But the grounds on which the
Court drew a line—the “deeply revealing nature of [CSLI], its depth,
breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and auto-
matic nature of its collection”26—are not unique to location data.
They characterize all sorts of digital records—including those at issue
in Miller and Smith, belying the majority’s claim that the decision
leaves third-party doctrine intact. Instead of avoiding Katz’s pitfalls,
the Court emphasized voluntary assumption of risk, doubling down
on the subjective nature of judicial interpretation. Even as it declared
the warrantless search of CSLI unreasonable, it introduced myriad
questions that will push the lower courts into uncharted territory.
Without clear direction, the decision is likely to lead to further chaos,
fragmentation in the circuits, and reversals in the courts of appeals—
far from the predictability and certainty essential to rule of law.
To mitigate the risk and take account of the significant challenges
ahead, this article proposes that, going forward, courts eschew vol-
untary assumption of risk. An outgrowth of open space and informant
doctrines, the approach imported analogical fallacies into the Court’s
jurisprudence and turned a blind eye to the implications of new
technologies. The perfunctory application of voluntariness to third-
party records further eviscerated the constitutional protections ex-
tended to private and commercial papers at the founding. The lack of
clarity in Carpenter between what can be understood as “device-use
compulsion” and “record-creation compulsion,” and the insertion of
the judiciary into that determination, forces judges into a policy-
making role. The Court’s emphasis on novel technologies will fur-
ther confound efforts to adjudicate Fourth Amendment claims in a
consistent manner.
To address problems created by Carpenter, this article advocates
a property-based approach in which the Court extends the rule of
functional equivalence, which characterizes home and border searches,
25 Id at 2219–20, 2223.
26 Id at 2223.
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to digital papers. The multifactor test employed in Carpenter—the
volume of information, its revealing nature, its retroactivity, its near
perfect recall, the length of time it was collected, and its precision—
underscores the extent to which information reveals the “privacies of
life.” While such factors may explain why data are considered within
the construct of “papers,” they are neither necessary nor sufficient. Just
as the Court has been clear that technology conveying information
about the interior of a home triggers Fourth Amendment protections
regardless of whether it exposes intimate details, so, too, should the
search of digital papers be sufficient to find them constitutionally pro-
tected—regardless of the level of intimacy revealed.
In ascertaining who owns digital documents and records, theCourt
can employ a but for analysis, asking whether the material would exist
but for the right-holder’s actions. In the context of CSLI, the right-
holder buys the phone, charges it, turns it on, and decides when and
where to carry it. It is up to the right-holder to decide with whom the
resulting location information is shared. Indeed, an individual could
not even contract to provide the information to others absent the
original right. Simultaneously, the owner has a separate claim on the
third party to perform a particular service (in exchange for money),
which only exists within the contractual relationship.
To determine whether, by providing access to information, the
right-holders divest themselves of their ownership interest in the
data, as Justice Gorsuch recognized in Carpenter, the law of bailment
and positive law have the potential to play a crucial role.27 English
common law has long recognized that possession is insufficient to
extinguish a property owner’s residual rights.28 A bailor and bailee
both hold rights in the same property.29 CSLI closely mirrors a
27 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2268 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
28 See Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, 2 History of English Law Before the
Time of Edward I 169 (Cambridge, 2d ed 1898).
29 See, for example, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Bailee at Common Law, in The Common
Law 164 (Little, Brown, 1881); Joseph H. Beale Jr., The Carrier’s Liability, 11 Harv L Rev 158
(1887); Thomas Atkins Street, 2 The Early Law of Bailment, in 2 Foundations of Legal Liability
251 (Edward Thompson, 1906); Percy Bordwell, Property in Chattels II: Property in the Bailor,
29 Harv L Rev 501 (1916); Percy Bordwell, Property in Chattels III: Property in the Bailee, 29
Harv L Rev 731 (1916); Eric G. M. Fletcher, The Carrier’s Liability (Stevens & Sons, 1932);
W. S. Holdsworth, 3 A History of English Law 336 (Methuen, 3d ed 1923); Theodore F. T.
Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 451–52 (Little, Brown, 5th ed 1956). See also
G. W. Paton, Bailment in the Common Law 48 (Stevens & Sons, 1952); C. H. S. Fifoot, History
and Sources of the Common Law: Tort and Contract 157–66 (Stevens & Sons, 1949); Samuel
Stoljar, The Early History of Bailment, 1 Am J Legal Hist 5 (1957).
11] FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE AND RESIDUAL RIGHTS 353
bailment in locatio rei, in which a considerable amount of control is
provided to the possessor, without altering the right-holder’s power—
in this case, over his or her location information. Positive law, in
turn, may prove probative in regard to the existence of a property
right: where federal or state law has acknowledged a property right and
placed a correlative duty of noninterference on others, government in-
trusions may constitute a search or seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. The approach advocated has the advantage of
clarity, adaptation to the modern world, and the restoration of core
Fourth Amendment rights protected at the founding.
II. Carpenter: A Case That Had to Happen
In 2018, the Court had little choice but to confront the issues
raised in Carpenter. Use of CSLI had become widespread. Enor-
mously powerful, it allowed law enforcement the ability to find sus-
pects, to place them near crimes, to verify (or undermine) alibis, to
discover what people had done (and with whom), and to discover
behavioral patterns. Simultaneously, it did not fit well within either
statutory law or Fourth Amendment doctrine—a situation exacer-
bated by the Court’s decisions in Riley v California and United States v
Jones.30 Faced with a jurisprudence that denied constitutional protec-
tions, defied common sense, and sent contradictory messages, lower
courts struggled with how to apply Katz. Central to the debate was
whether telephone users voluntarily divulged location information to
others—a question rooted in informant doctrine and bedeviled by the
contemporary dependence on mobile devices.
a. statutory framing
As CSLI came of age, it was not immediately apparent whether
statutory provisions authorized law enforcement to collect it. The
government began by arguing that it fell within the criminal pen
register and trap and trace provisions (PRTT).31 But virtually every
court to confront the question rejected this approach, not least be-
cause the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
30 Riley v California, 134 S Ct 2473 (2014), taken in conjunction with United States v Wurie,
728 F3d 1 (2013), cert granted 134 S Ct 999 (2014); United States v Jones, 565 US 400 (2012).
31 18 USC §§ 3121–27.
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(CALEA) expressly forbade the use of pen register statutes to collect
location data.32
In 1994, Congress had passed CALEA to require service providers
to be able to provide law enforcement with information for which it
had legal authorization.33 The hearings aired significant worry about
the government’s potential use of service providers’ records to track
individuals. During his testimony, Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI)Director Louis Freeh acknowledged this concern, declared that
the government had no intention of collecting location data, and
offered to make it clear in the statutory language that the caller’s
location would be excluded.34 Congress adopted Freeh’s clarification
almost verbatim.35 But the statute, which stated that information may
not be collected “solely pursuant” to PRTT provisions, appeared to
leave open the possibility of a separate authorization. The govern-
32 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), Pub L No 103-414
§ 103(a)(2)(b), 108 Stat 4279, 4280–81 (1994). See, for example, In re Applications of the United
States for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F Supp 2d 64
(D Mass 2007); In re Application of United States for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location
Based Services, 2007 WL 2086663 (SD Tex); In re Application of the United States for an Order
Authorizing the Disclosure of Prospective Cell Site Information, 412 F Supp 2d 947 (ED Wis
2006); In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing Installation and Use of a Pen
Register, 415 F Supp 2d 211 (WDNY 2006); In re Application of United States for an Order for
Prospective Cell Site Location Information on a Certain Cellular Telephone, 2006 WL 468300
(SDNY); In re United States, 2006 WL 1876847 (ND Ind); In re United States, 441 F Supp 2d
816 (SD Tex 2006); In re Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 384 F Supp 2d 562 (EDNY
2005); In re Application for Pen Register and Trap /Trace Device with Cell Site Location Authority,
396 F Supp 2d 747 (SD Tex 2005); In re Application of the United States for an Order, 396 F
Supp 2d 294 (EDNY 2005).
33 Within four years, service providers had to be able to provide law enforcement agencies
with “access call-identifying information that is reasonably available to the carrier—(A) be-
fore, during, or immediately after the transmission of a wire or electronic communication
(or at such later time as may be acceptable to the government); and (B) in a manner that
allows it to be associated with the communication to which it pertains, except that, with
regard to information acquired solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap and
trace devices (as defined in [18 USC § 3127]).” 47 USC § 1002(a)(2). See 47 USC § 1001
note.
34 See Digital Telephony and Law Enforcement Access to Advanced Telecommunications Technol-
ogies and Services: Joint Hearings on H.R. 4922 and S. 2375 before the Subcommittee on Technology
and the Law of the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Judiciary Committee, 103d Cong, 2d Sess 29–34 (1994) (Statement of FBI
Director Freeh).
35 47 USC § 1002(a)(2). See also Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, HR Rep
No 103-827, Part I, 103d Cong, 2d Sess 17 (1994), reprinted in 1994 USCCAN 3489, 3497
(The bill “[e]xpressly provides that the authority for pen registers and trap and trace devices
cannot be used to obtain tracking and location information, other than that which can be
determined from the phone number.”).
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ment quickly turned to an alternative anchor: the Stored Commu-
nications Act (SCA).36
The key question under the SCA was whether the collection of
CSLI turned a phone into a “tracking device” or whether what was
being sought wasmerely a “record.”37 If the phonewas understood as a
tracking device, the statute exempted the data from disclosure under
18 USC § 2703.38 Courts thus paid careful attention to how accu-
rately the technology conveyed location.39
For real-time or prospective information, courts considered the
phone to be acting as a tracking device and thus outside the SCA, with
the result that probable cause and a warrant would be required to
obtain the data.40 In contrast, numerous courts considered historic
36 Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 USC § 2701 et seq. See, for example, In re
Application of the United States for an Order for Disclosure of Telecommunications Records and
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace, 405 F Supp 2d 435, 436 (EDNY
2005). Some courts rejected the argument that the government could apply under different
statutory provisions, saying that CALEA sought to foreclose other options. See In re Ap-
plication of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Release of Prospective Cell Site Infor-
mation, 407 F Supp 2d 134 (DDC 2006).
37 See, for example, People v Hall, 823 NYS 2d 334 (NY 2006); In re Application of United
States for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Information on a Certain Cellular Telephone,
460 F Supp 2d 448 (SDNY 2006); In re Application for an Order Authorizing the Extension and
Use of a Pen Register Device, 2007 WL 397129 (ED Cal); In re Application of United States for an
Order Relating to Target Phone 2, 733 F Supp 2d 939, 942–43 (ND Ill 2009).
38 The statute defined “electronic communication” as “any transfer of signs, signals, writ-
ing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a
wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric or photooptical system that affects interstate or
foreign commerce, but does not include . . . (C) any communication from a tracking device (as
defined in section 3117 of this title).” 18 USC § 2510(12) (emphasis added). That section
defined “tracking device” as “an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking
of the movement of a person or object.” 18 USC § 3117. If a mobile phone is a tracking de-
vice, then the electronic signals from it do not count as “electronic communications” for SCA
purposes—so 18 USC § 2703(d) is inapplicable.
39 See, for example, In re Application of the United States for an Order, 396 F Supp 2d at 310;
In re Application of the United States for an Order for Disclosure of Telecommunications Records and
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace, 405 F Supp 2d at 438; In re Application
of the Unites States for an Order, 411 F Supp 2d 678, 679–80 (WD La 2006); In re Application of
the United States for Orders Authorizing the Installation and Use of Pen Registers and Caller
Identification Devices on Telephone Numbers, 416 F Supp 2d 390, 396 (D Md 2006); In re United
States for an Order, 433 F Supp 2d 804, 806 (SD Tex 2006); United States v Bermudez, 2006
WL 3197181 (SD Ind).
40 See, for example, In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of
Location Information of a Specified Wireless Telephone, 849 F Supp 2d 526, 575 (D Md 2011); In
re Application of United States for an Order, 2009 WL 1530195, ∗3–4 (EDNY); In re United
States, 416 F Supp 2d at 397; Bermudez, 2006 WL 3197181, ∗7 (noting that 18 USC § 2703
does not allow real-time tracking); In re United States, 441 F Supp 2d at 828; In re Applica-
tion of the United States for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Prospective Cell Site Information,
2006 WL 2871743, ∗6 (ED Wis) (18 USC § 2703 is only retrospective); United States v
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CSLI to be a “record” under 18USC § 2703.41 Here, the government
only had to meet the requirements in § 2703(d). The government
argued that because the information was derived from wire (not elec-
tronic) communications, the tracking device exception did not apply.42
As for tower dumps (i.e., a record of every phone using a particular
tower), courts generally considered them to qualify as a search under
the Fourth Amendment.43 The collection of information on innocent
citizens and the volume of information mattered: in some requests,
providers turned over up to 150,000 telephone numbers in a given area
at a particular time.44
b. doctrinal placement
Like the statutory realm, the Court’s jurisprudence did not provide
an easy fit for CSLI, which fell somewhere between public versus
private space and third-party doctrine (both of which consistently
ignored the impact of technology on Fourth Amendment rights) and
more recent decisions that had begun to acknowledge the privacy
interests at stake.45 The shadow of Katz, and the subjective nature of
the reasonableness test, loomed large.
1. First analogical fallacy: the application of assumption of risk and
fairness ( from public space doctrine) to location tracking. The Supreme
Court has long held that observation outdoors does not constitute
Espudo, 954 F Supp 2d 1029, 1036–37 (SD Cal 2013) (prospective CSLI does not create a
“record” under 2703, which is only for data already captured). But see United States v Powell,
943 F Supp 2d 759, 777 (ED Mich 2013) (deciding a mobile phone is not a tracking device
because it is not owned by the government and 18 USC § 3117 is geared toward installation).
Courts have, for prospective CSLI, tended to resolve the question under Knotts and the
public/private distinction, and not within the third-party context. See, for example, United
States v Forest, 355 F3d 942, 950–52 (6th Cir 2004). One court has found that even if an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in real-time location data, the government
does not violate it by arresting her, without a warrant, while she is traveling with the target of
the surveillance. See United States v Peters, 333 F Supp 3d 366, 376–78 (D Vt 2018).
41 See, for example, In re United States for an Order Authorizing the Use of Two Pen Register
and Trap and Trace Devices, 632 F Supp 2d 202, 207 (EDNY 2008); In re Application of the
United States for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of Cell Site Location Information, 2009 WL
8231744 (ED Ky).
42 In re Application of United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic Communi-
cation Service to Disclose Records to Government, 620 F3d 304, 310 (3d Cir 2010).
43 See, for example, In re United States ex rel Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(d), 930 F
Supp 2d 698, 702 (SD Tex 2012); In re Application of United States for an Order Pursuant to 18
USC § 2703(d), 964 F Supp 2d 674, 678 (SDNY 2013).
44 In re Application of United States, 964 F Supp 2d at 678.
45 See also Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2215–16, 2218–19 (discussing Knotts and Jones).
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a search.46 Following Katz, it came to include anything that could be
seen from the air or on the ground—from greenhouses missing roof
tiles to cars traveling along thoroughfares.47 These cases often down-
played the privacy implications of new technologies, even lauding their
use for ensuring more accurate information.48
The Court’s argument as to why individuals had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in public ultimately turned on a two-part ar-
gument grounded in assumed risk and fairness. First, what an indi-
vidual knowingly exposed to others was different fromwhat he or she
sought to keep private. By deciding to go outside and get into a car,
individuals knowingly ran the risk that others would be able to ob-
serve them. Second, a basic principle of fairness applied: it would be
strange to tell a police officer that shemust close her eyes or cover her
ears to block what anyone else could see or hear.49 Traveling in public
therefore fell outside the protections of the Fourth Amendment.
CSLI, at first glance, appeared to come within the public/private
distinction: if there was no privacy interest in a global positioning
46 See, for example, Hester v United States, 265 US 57 (1924) (observation of open fields
does not constitute a search); Air Pollution Variance Board v Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 US 861
(1974) (conducting opacity test on smoke coming out of a stack up to a quarter of a mile away
does not constitute a search); Oliver v United States, 466 US 170, 178 (1984) (“[A]n individual
may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in
the area immediately surrounding the home.”); United States v Dunn, 480 US 294, 304 (1987)
(“Under Oliver and Hester, there is no constitutional difference between police observations
conducted while in a public place and while standing in the open fields.”); California v
Greenwood, 486 US 35, 40 (1988) (citations omitted) (examination of garbage left at the curb
does not constitute a search on the grounds that it is “readily accessible to animals, children,
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public”).
47 See California v Ciraolo, 476 US 207, 211 (1986) (noting that even high fences “might not
shield [marijuana plants] from the eyes of a citizen or a policeman perched on the top of a
truck or a two-level bus.”); Dow Chemical Co. v United States, 476 US 227, 236, 239 (1986)
(drawing a distinction between private and public space and holding that while the company
had a “reasonable, legitimate, and objective expectation of privacy within the interior of its
covered buildings,” it did not have one in regard to areas visible outside the structure); Florida
v Riley, 488 US 445 (1989) (holding that areas visible from the air were not protected under
the Fourth Amendment); Cardwell v Lewis, 417 US 583, 590 (1974) (plurality) (“A car has
little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where its occupants
and its contents are in plain view.”); United States v Karo, 468 US 705 (1984); United States v
Knotts, 460 US 276 (1983). Compare United States v Michael, 622 F2d 744 (5th Cir 1980)
(holding that warrantless installation of a beeper outside of exigent circumstances required
prior judicial authorization), rehearing granted, 628 F2d 931 (5th Cir 1980), rev’d, 645 F2d
252 (5th Cir 1981) (holding that installation of a beeper requires only reasonable suspicion).
48 See, for example, Knotts, 460 US at 282 (“Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited
the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such
enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case.”).
49 See also Katz, 389 US at 361 (Harlan, J, concurring) (considering actions in public to lay
outside Fourth Amendment protections).
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system (GPS) chip on a car, why would it be any different in regard to
a GPS chip in a telephone? Either way, the information revealed the
location of an individual in public space. GPS, moreover, is accurate
within centimeters. Why should CSLI, which is less accurate, come
within the protections of the Fourth Amendment?
The picture, though, was more complicated. For one, cars gen-
erally do not follow individuals inside the curtilage of the home.
Phones do. For another, the ubiquity ofmobile devices resulted in the
generation of terabytes of information about millions of people for
lengthy periods of time. This raised deeper privacy implications than
someone watching a car drive by. It was unclear, though, whether and
how this distinction impacted the doctrine. If there were no interests
implicated at the front end, what created the back-end right? The
only doctrinally relevant question was whether it was a search at the
outset.50 In addition, unlike GPS systems or RFID chips, for mobile
devices, law enforcement did not have to do or attach anything to the
individual or vehicle in order to obtain extensive amounts of infor-
mation.51 It was not entirely clear how this cut. Finally, both parts of
the Court’s logic for the public/private distinction—that upon en-
tering the public sphere an individual assumed the risk that other
citizens could observe them, and that there was something funda-
mentally unfair about disadvantaging law enforcement in comparison
to others—rang somewhat hollow when no person actually could
observe an individual twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, for
months, or even years without end.
2. Second analogical fallacy: the application of assumption of risk and
voluntariness ( from informant doctrine) to third-party records.The second
jurisprudential home, third-party doctrine, proved equally prob-
lematic. It derived from cases dealing with informers that predated
Katz and continued in its wake.52 Like open space doctrine, the in-
formant cases saw technology not as deepening any expectation of
privacy, but merely as enhancing human capabilities and offering a
50 See United States v Graham, 846 F Supp 2d 384 (D Md 2012).
51 In re Application of the United States for an Order for Disclosure of Telecommunications Records
and Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace, 405 F Supp 2d 435, 449 (SDNY
2005).
52 For informant cases prior to Katz, see On Lee v United States, 343 US 747 (1952); Lopez v
United States, 373 US 427 (1963); Hoffa v United States, 385 US 293 (1966); Lewis v United
States, 385 US 206 (1966). For cases following Katz, see United States v White, 401 US 745
(1971); United States v Caceres, 440 US 741 (1979).
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more efficient way to get (more) accurate information.53 They also
followed a parallel assumption-of-risk argument: voluntarily confiding
information in others meant that an individual essentially consented
to the possibility that the other person would divulge the information
to others.54
Katz did nothing to alter the calculation. In 1971, the Court
maintained its stance in United States v White, in which a prosecutor
introduced a recorded conversation between an informer and a sus-
pect at trial.55 JusticeWhite, writing for the Court, explained, “[O]ne
contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his com-
panions may be reporting to the police. . . . [I]f he has no doubts, or
allays them, or risks what doubt he has, the risk is his.”56
In Miller, Justice Powell, writing for the Court, cited back to the
informant cases to exempt third-party business records from the
protections of the Fourth Amendment:
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and con-
veyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose
and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.57
For the Court, just as criminals assumed the risk in telling others of
their plans that someone would pass on that information, so, too, did
the decision to provide financial information to a bank deprive it of
Fourth Amendment protections. The key was that the data were
53 See, for example, Lopez v United States, 373 US 427, 438–39 (1963) (the Constitution
does not recognize a right to probe “flaws in the agent’s memory, or to challenge the agent’s
credibility without being beset by corroborating evidence that is not susceptible of im-
peachment.”); White, 401 US at 751–52 (plurality) (“If the law gives no protection to the
wrongdoer whose trusted accomplice is or becomes a police agent, neither should it protect
him when that same agent has recorded or transmitted the conversations”); id at 753 (arguing
that the Court should not “be too ready to erect constitutional barriers to relevant and
probative evidence which is also accurate and reliable.”).
54 See On Lee v United States, 343 US at 751–53 (by confiding information to an undercover
agent on whom a microphone had been placed, On Lee consented to the possibility that law
enforcement would overhear the conversation); Lopez, 373 US at 438–39 (use of a recording
device did nothing to alter the assumption of risk); Hoffa, 385 US at 303 (“The risk of being
overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer . . . is the kind of risk we necessarily
assume whenever we speak.”).
55 White, 401 US at 746–47 (plurality).
56 Id at 752.
57 United States v Miller, 425 US 435, 443 (1976). In Carpenter, Gorsuch asks what theory
underlies the assumption of risk argument in third-party doctrine tying it back, potentially, to
tort law. See Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2263 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
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voluntarily divulged, indicating that the individual consented to the
possibility that they would be provided to others.58 By applying this
logic to third-party business records, the Court employed an ana-
logical fallacy with profound implications.
Most critically, by equating spoken words with “papers and effects,”
the Court buried an essential Fourth Amendment protection. At the
founding, “papers”had a privilegedplace in theConstitution, reflecting
the contemporary view that such documents were protected from
government inspection.59 In the 1765 case of Entick v Carrington,
Lord Camden famously reflected, “Papers are the owner’s goods and
chattels: they are his dearest property; and are so far from enduring a
seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspection.”60 The Father of
Candor seized on the case and loosed a vitriolic attack on the Crown:
“What then, can bemore excruciating torture, than to have the lowest
of mankind . . . enter suddenly into [Entick’s] house, and forcibly carry
awayhis scrutores, with all his papers of every kind, under a pretence of
law.”61 Entry mattered. But of equal importance was doing so to access
Entick’s papers. Reeling from the trials associated with the Crown’s
effort to apprehend Entick and “the authors, printers, and publishers”
of North Britain No. 45, Parliament passed a resolution condemning
the Crown’s actions and expressing strong protections for private and
commercial documents.62 Edmund Burke wrote, “The lawful secrets
of business and friendship were rendered inviolable, by the [Parlia-
mentary] resolution for condemning the seizure of papers.”63
58 Miller, 425 US at 442 (“All of the documents obtained . . . contain only information
voluntarily conveyed to the banks.”).
59 Donald A. Dripps, “Dearest Property”: Digital Evidence and the History of Private “Papers”
as Special Objects of Search and Seizure, 103 J Crim L & Criminol 49 (2013); Thomas K.
Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 Wake
Forest L Rev 307 (1998).
60 Entick v Carrington, 19 Howell St Tr 1030 (KB 1765).
61 Father of Candor, A Letter Concerning Libels, Warrants, the Seisure of Papers, and Sureties
for the Peace of Behavior (7th ed 1770) (first published in 1764 as An enquiry into the doctrine
lately propagated concerning libels, warrents, and the seizure of papers, with likely authorship John
Almon).
62 The General Warrant on Which John Wilkes Was Arrested, 30 April 1763, in D. B. Horn,
ed, English Historical Documents 1714–1815 61, 61–62 (Methuen, 1967). See also Donohue, 83
U Chi L Rev at 1196–1207 (cited in note 5).
63 1 Edmund Burke, A Short Account of a Late Short Administration (1766), in The Works of
the Right Honorable Edmund Burke 265, 265 (1865), quoted in Dripps, 103 J Crim L &
Criminol at 72 (cited in note 59) (emphasis added).
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Americans were equally appalled at the Crown’s reach.64 Papers—
whether social, personal, or commercial—were sacrosanct.65 Accord-
ingly, the new state constitutions, as well as the federal constitution,
protected “papers.”66 For nearly a century, there was no effortmade by
Congress to obtain personal or business-related documents. It was not
until 1863 that the first statute appeared, authorizing warrants to ob-
tain “any invoices, books, or papers” related to undutied goods.67 It was
an enormous departure from the status quo—and from Entick, which
was still good law.68 Whether or not it was “reasonable” to obtain com-
mercial papers was of no consequence. The government could not
obtain them at all. Accordingly, the Boyd Court flatly rejected the
statute, noting that it was the first time in the history of England or
the United States that a legislature had tried to search and seize, or to
compel the production, of “a man’s private papers . . . for the purpose
of using them in evidence against him in a criminal case.”69 Forcing
the production of papers “would be subversive of all the comforts of
society.”70
The Boyd Court got it right: alteration did have profound conse-
quences. Starting with Miller, the ability of the people to engage in
commercial relationships within the protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment sharply eroded. The Miller Court failed to acknowledge that
what was potentially at stake was all of a person’s business records—
effectively eviscerating a critical constitutional right.
The analogical reasoning underlying third-party doctrine also
failed to appreciate that there was a world of difference between
confiding illegal behavior in (supposed) coconspirators, and engaging
in an entirely legal, contractual relationship to conduct business. The
information entrusted to a bank was provided for a specific, legal pur-
pose. The customers’ financial records were not publicly available.
Indeed, banks were under a legal obligation not to allow the information
64 Donohue, 83 U Chi L Rev at 1257–60 (cited in note 5).
65 H. Brian Holland, A Cognitive Theory of the Third-Party Doctrine and Digital Papers, 91
Temple L Rev 55, 60 (2018).
66 See Pa Const of 1776, Decl of Rights Art X (superseded 1790); NH Const of 1783, Bill
of Rights Art XIX; Vt Const of 1777, Decl of Rights Art XI (superseded 1793); Ma Const of
1780, Part the First: Declaration of Rights Art XIV; US Const, Amend IV.
67 See Act of Mar 3, 1863, ch 76, 12 Stat 737, 740.
68 See generally Dripps, 103 J Crim L & Criminol at 72 (cited in note 59).
69 Boyd v United States, 116 US 616, 622 (1886).
70 Id at 628.
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to be made public. Although Congress responded to Miller with the
Right to Financial Privacy Act, the Court held its course.71
Another weakness in the analogy centered on consent. InMiller, as
aforementioned, the Court assumed that, like the criminal confiding
in potential accomplices, the person with a bank account knew that
the bank might turn the information over to others.72 This argument
performs a sleight of hand: consenting to give the bank access to fi-
nancial data for a specific use is not the same as consenting to the
company releasing it to the public at large—much less to the gov-
ernment.73 To the contrary, it is a limited disclosure for a specific,
contractual purpose.
Finally, the analogical reasoning failed in regard to its emphasis on
voluntariness. It assumed that, just like confiding in coconspirators,
submitting financial information to the bank was voluntary.74 The
Court did not consider whether banking itself was voluntary in the
modern world. Nor did it give any credence to the fact that the Bank
Secrecy Act required the bank to obtain consumer information and
maintain certain records.75 For the Court, “The depositor [took] the
risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information [would]
be conveyed by that person to the Government.”76
To summarize, analogizing between informant doctrine and third-
party records buried a critical constitutional protection for com-
mercial “papers”; equated legal, contractual relationships with the
secret whisperings of criminals (thereby denying the former protec-
tion); assumed that consenting to provide information to a third party
for a limited, legal purpose amounted to acquiescing to government
71 Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub L No 95-630, 92 Stat 3641.
72 See also Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2263 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting) (“Consenting to give a third
party access to private papers that remain my property is not the same thing as consenting to
a search of those papers by the government.”) (emphasis in original); id (citing and quoting Kerr,
107 Mich L Rev at 588 (“So long as a person knows that they are disclosing information to a
third party, their choice to do so is voluntary and the consent valid”) (cited in note 19).
73 See also Smith v Maryland, 442 US 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J, dissenting) (“Privacy is
not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all. Those who disclose certain facts
to a bank or phone company for a limited business purpose need not assume that this in-
formation will be released to other persons for other purposes”).
74 Miller, 425 US at 442 (“[a]ll of the documents obtained, including financial statements
and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to
their employees in the ordinary course of business.”) (emphasis added).
75 Id at 442–43.
76 Id at 443 (citing White, Hoffa, and Lopez).
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search of the material; and presumed that conducting business as part
of the ordinary affairs of modern life was voluntary.
As they confronted CSLI, the lower courts wrestled with the vol-
untariness component, seeing it as the linchpin for ascertaining whether
third-party doctrine applied. They questioned the extent to which
individuals freely elected either to carry phones or to provide their
location to the service provider.77 With precious little guidance from
Katz or its progeny, the decisions ended up all over the map.
Some judges considered the provision of CSLI to be voluntary.78
Others came out on the other side.79 One of the most notable cases
arose in 2008 in the Third Circuit, where all of the magistrate judges
in the Western District of Pennsylvania, in a highly unusual move,
cosigned an opinion rejecting a § 2703(d) order for historical cell site
data.80 The decision turned on whether customers voluntarily pro-
vided location information. The court recognized the ubiquitous use
of cell phones and observed that users do not share their location “in
any meaningful way.”81 “[W ]hen a cell phone user receives a call,”
moreover, “he hasn’t voluntarily exposed anything at all.”82 The court
considered the phone to be a tracking device, for which a warrant was
77 See, for example, In re Application of the United States for an Order for Disclosure of
Telecommunications Records and Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace, 405 F
Supp 2d at 449; In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of
Cell Site Location Information, 2009 WL 8231744 (ED Ky).
78 See, for example, United States v Gordon, 2012 WL 8499876 (DDC) (upholding); United
States v Ruby, 2013 WL 544888 (SD Cal) (upholding six weeks of CSLI on grounds they are
business records/not protected under Smith and Miller); United States v Rigmaiden, 2013 WL
1932800 (D Ariz) (Smith and Miller control); United States v Denard, 24 F3d 599 (5th Cir
2013).
79 See, for example, In re Application of United States for an Order Directing a Provider of
Electronic Communication Service to Disclose Records to Government, 620 F3d 304 (3rd Cir 2010);
In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F Supp 2d 827 (SD Tex 2010).
80 In re United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic Communication Service to
Disclose Records to the Government, 534 F Supp 2d 585 (WD Pa 2008). The appellate court
commented, “This is unique in the author’s experience of more than three decades on this
court and demonstrates the impressive level of support Magistrate Judge Lenihan’s opinion
has among her colleagues.” In re Application for an Order, 620 F3d at 308.
81 In re Application for an Order, 620 F3d at 317. See also In re United States, 534 F Supp 2d
at 589 (“Our individual cell phones now come with us everywhere: not only on the streets,
but in (a) business, financial, medical and other offices; (b) restaurants, theaters and other
venues of leisure activity; (c) churches, synagogues and other places of religious affiliation;
and (d) our homes and those of our family members, friends, and personal and professional
associates.”).
82 In re Application for an Order, 620 F3d at 317–18.
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required.83 Rule 41, amended by the Supreme Court in 2006, pro-
vided for the installation and use of a tracking device, for a renewable
period not to exceed forty-five days.84 Failure to meet these require-
ments resulted in exclusion of the evidence.85
The government appealed the magistrates’ decision to the District
Court, which, recognizing the complex issues in the case, affirmed
the decision in a short, two-page order, kicking it up to the Court of
Appeals for de novo review. TheThirdCircuit concurred, saying that
the magistrate had the discretion to require a warrant.86 The gov-
ernment could not force a disclosure with less if a court considered
the records to be more sensitive.
3. Addressing the technology gap: Jones, Riley, and disarray. The sub-
jective nature of the test from Katz, in concert with technological
advances and inherent doctrinal hostility to acknowledging any re-
sultant constitutional implications, created a world in which “the
right of the people to be secure” against government inspection steadily
narrowed. The dissonance between the supposed reasonableness test
and reality demanded attention. But as the Supreme Court began
acknowledging the deeper privacy interests in mobile telephone–
related technologies, the application of Katz to location tracking was
thrown into further doubt.
One of themost important cases,United States v Jones, originated in
the 2010 case ofUnited States vMaynard. The FBI placed aGPS device
on a suspected drug dealer’s car while it was on private property and
then tracked the position of the car every ten seconds for twenty-eight
days, without a warrant. The D.C. Circuit held that the tracking
amounted to a search, which was per se unreasonable and thus, absent
a warrant, violated the Fourth Amendment.87 Writing for the panel,
Judge Douglas Ginsburg zeroed in on one of the analogical fallacies
in open space doctrine: he concluded that Jones had not knowingly
exposed his behavior to the public “because the likelihood anyone
83 In re United States, 534 F Supp 2d at 613–14.
84 Id at 592.
85 Id.
86 In re Application for an Order, 620 F3d at 317.
87 United States v Maynard, 615 F3d 544, 555–56 (DC Cir 2010), rehearing en banc denied,
United States v Jones, 625 F3d 766 (DC Cir 2010) (mem), cert denied, Maynard v United
States, 131 S Ct 671 (2010) (mem).
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will observe all those movements is effectively nil.”88 While, perhaps,
physically possible, a reasonable person would not expect a govern-
ment agent to tail them twenty-four hours a day for a month.
The Supreme Court granted cert inMaynard (renamed Jones) and
ultimately decided the case based on trespass.89 Two concurrences,
though, created a “shadow majority” that cast doubt on location track-
ing and the future of third-party doctrine.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor wrote, “GPS mon-
itoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations.”90 Sotomayor indi-
cated that she might go so far as to reconsider third-party doctrine
altogether, noting that it was “ill-suited to the digital age, in which
people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third
parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”91
Justice Alito, in a concurring opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Kagan, similarly raised arguments that challenged loca-
tion tracking and third-party doctrine. “[W]hat is really important,”
he suggested, is “the use of a GPS for the purpose of long-term track-
ing.”92 Themajority’s approach led “to incongruous results.”93 Under
the open space doctrine, no Fourth Amendment interest would be
implicated if law enforcement had followed the car, even longer,
from the air and the ground. So why would the installation of a GPS
chip yield a different result?94 What would the constitutional analysis
have been if law enforcement had simply tracked a GPS system al-
ready installed in the car?95 Alito expressed concern at myriad “new
devices that permit the monitoring of a person’s movements,” ac-
knowledging that “cell phones and other wireless devices now permit
wireless carriers to track and record the location of users,” which im-
plicated more than 322 million wireless devices.96 The point at which
88 Maynard, 615 F3d at 558, 563.
89 United States v Jones, 565 US 400 (2012).
90 Id at 417 (Sotomayor, J, concurring).
91 Id.
92 Jones, 565 US at 424 (Alito, J, concurring).
93 Id at 425.
94 Id.
95 Id at 426.
96 Jones, 565 US at 428.
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the tracking became a search “was surely crossed before the 4-week
mark.”97
Two years after Jones, the Supreme Court again wrestled with how
to applyKatz in a way that took account of the intrusiveness of mobile
technologies. Riley v California focused on another exception carved
out by the Court post-Katz: search incident to arrest.98 In Riley, a law
enforcement officer stopped the petitioner for a traffic violation,
leading to an arrest on weapons charges.99 During the arrest, the
officer, discovering a mobile phone in Riley’s pants pocket, scrolled
through it and found photographs, videos, and language suggesting
involvement in gang activity.100 Based in part on the data uncovered,
the government prosecuted him for a prior shooting with a sentence
enhancement for membership in the Bloods.101
The Supreme Court objected, carving out (yet another) exception
to an exception: officers may search an individual incident to arrest
without a warrant, but if they want to inspect a telephone they must
first obtain a warrant.102 The immense storage capacity of cell phones
had “several interrelated consequences for privacy”: they collect
more information in one place than present in isolated records; the
volume at stake in even one category of information may be enor-
mous; data held on the device can stretch back for years; and the
records provide a detailed and comprehensive view into an individ-
ual’s private life.103
Together, Jones and Riley indicated judicial disquiet at how the
exceptions carved out post-Katz had failed to take account of the
97 Id at 431.
98 Riley v California, 134 S Ct 2473 (2014), taken in conjunction with United States v Wurie,
728 F3d 1 (2013), cert granted 134 S Ct 999 (2014). See also Chimel v California, 395 US 752,
762–63 (1969) (requiring a search incident to arrest be restricted to the area of the arrestee’s
immediate control as justified by the need for officer safety and preservation of evidence);
United States v Robinson, 414 US 218, 235 (1973) (holding, “[t]he authority to search the
person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to
discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a
particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of
the suspect.”); United States v Chadwick, 433 US 1, 15 (1977) (limiting the search incident to
arrest exception to “personal property . . . immediately associated with the person of the
arrestee.”).
99 Riley, 134 S Ct at 2480.
100 Id.
101 Id at 2481.
102 Id at 2485.
103 Riley, 134 S Ct at 2489–91.
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impact of new technologies on Fourth Amendment rights. But they
did not squarely address the underlying doctrinal concerns.
4. Growing judicial tension. In the aftermath of Jones, the Fifth,
Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits held that historic CSLI amounted
to information voluntarily conveyed to a third party and thus controlled
by Miller and Smith and not abrogated by Jones.104 Simultaneously,
the judiciary expressed significant frustration and concern. In 2017,
the Tenth Circuit raised alarm at the implications, writing, “[W]e,
too, fear the Orwellian-style surveillance state that could emerge from
unfettered government collection of personal data.”105 But “until the
Supreme Court instructs us otherwise, we are bound to follow its
104 SeeUnited States v Richardson, 732 Fed Appx 822, 828 (11th Cir 2018) (per curiam) (holding
warrantless acquisition of cell-tower data as outside the Fourth Amendment); United States v
Banks, 884 F3d 998, 1011–13 (10th Cir 2018) (finding a state court order for historical and real-
time tracking consistent with statutory requirements and exigent circumstances); United States v
Thompson, 866 F3d 1149, 1156–59 (10thCir 2017), cert granted, 138 SCt 2706 (stating coveredby
Smith/Miller);United States v Carpenter, 819 F3d 880, 887–88 (6th Cir 2016) (adding the content/
noncontent distinction, saying that Smith is mainly about noncontent and concluding, “The
business records here fall on the unprotected side of this line.Those records say nothing about the
content of any calls.”);United States v Davis, 785 F3d 498, 511 (11th Cir 2015) (en banc) (there is
“no reason to conclude that cell phone users lack facts about the functions of cell towers or about
telephone providers’ recording cell tower usage.”);United States v Graham, 824 F3d 421, 424–26
(4th Cir 2016) (en banc) (overturning panel on third-party grounds); In re Application of the United
States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F3d 600, 614, 610, 613–14 (5th Cir 2013) (even though user
“does not directly inform his service provider of the location of the nearest cell phone tower,” it is
the company that holds the information, demonstrating that the customer “knowingly exposes his
activities” to the third party. Additionally, use of a mobile phone is “entirely voluntary.”); United
States v Skinner, 690 F3d 772, 777 (6th Cir 2012) (defendant has no “reasonable expectation of
privacy in the data given off by his voluntarily procured pay-as-you-go cell phone.”). Compare
United States v Riley, 858 F3d 1012, 1018 (6th Cir 2017) (Court of Appeals held that police officers
did not conduct search under Fourth Amendment when it tracked real-time GPS coordinates of
firearmdefendant’s cell phone for seven hours on date of his arrest), andUnited States v Forest, 355
F3d 942, 950–52 (6th Cir 2004) (rejectingMiller/Smith but applying Knotts to find no reasonable
expectation of privacy in CSLI and holding that coconspirator lacked standing to bring a con-
stitutional claim simply because he also was being tracked when they were together). Numerous
district court cases followed suit. See, for example,United States v Jones, 2018 WL 3212073 (ED
Ky); United States v Serrano, 2017 WL 3055244 (SDNY); United States v Rosario, 2017 WL
2117534 (NDIll);United States vAdkinson, 2017WL1318420, ∗5 (SD Ind);United States v Lambis,
197 F Supp 3d 606, 615 (SDNY 2016);United States vWheeler, 169 F Supp 3d 896, 910 (EDWis
2016);United States v Lang, 78 F Supp 3d 830, 836 (ND Ill 2015);United States v Rogers, 71 F Supp
3d 745 (ND Ill 2014); United States v Moreno-Nevarez, 2013 WL 5631017, ∗2 (SD Cal); United
States v Money, 2013 WL 412626 (ED Ky); United States v Caraballo, 963 F Supp 2d 341 (D Vt
2013); United States v Degaule, 797 F Supp 2d 1332 (ND Ga 2011); United States v Benford, 2010
WL 1266507, ∗2–3 (ND Ind); United States v Navas, 640 F Supp 2d 256 (SDNY 2009), rev’d in
part on other grounds,United States v Navas, 597 F3d 492 (2dCir 2010); In re Applications of United
States for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, US Code, Section 2703(d), 509 F Supp 2d 81 (DMass 2007).
105 United States v Thompson, 866 F3d 1149, 1159 (10th Cir 2017) (also writing, “Thompson
raises valid concerns about the third-party doctrine in the digital age.”). See also Carpenter,
819 F3d 893–94 (Stranch concurring in the judgment but rejecting the reasoning) (writing
“the sheer quantity of sensitive information procured without a warrant in this case raises
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third-party doctrine precedents.”106 The Fourth Circuit reflected,
“The Supreme Court may in the future limit, or even eliminate, the
third-party doctrine. . . . Butwithout a change in controlling law,” their
hands were tied.107
Scathing criticism of third-party doctrine followed. In the Fourth
Circuit, Judge Wynn stated there was “no reason to think that a cell
phone user is aware of his CSLI or that he is conveying it,” and noted
that such information was recorded even when users receive calls,
taking no action of their own.108 In the EleventhCircuit JudgeMartin
wrote that the “application of the third-party doctrine threatens to
allow the government access to a staggering amount of information
that surely must be protected under the Fourth Amendment.”109 Sev-
eral state supreme courts flatly contradicted the Supreme Court,
holding that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in real time
or historic CSLI under state constitutional provisions nearly iden-
tical to the Fourth Amendment.110
In the Sixth Circuit,United States v Carpenter reflected the growing
confusion and concern among the lower courts. A man arrested for
a series of robberies confessed to the crime and identified fifteen
Fourth Amendment concerns of the type the Supreme Court acknowledged in United States v
Jones,” and observing that “the addition of cellular (not to mention internet) communication
has left courts struggling to determine if (and how) existing [Fourth Amendment] tests apply
or whether new tests should be framed,” but finding, nevertheless, that the good faith ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule applied).
106 Thompson, 866 F3d at 1154.
107 United States v Graham, 824 F3d at 425–26.
108 Id at 445 (Wynn, J, concurring).
109 United States v (Quartavious) Davis, 785 F3d 498, 535 (11th Cir 2015) (en banc) (Martin
dissenting).
110 See Commonwealth v Holley, 87 NE3d 77 (Mass 2017); Jones v United States, 168 A3d 703
(DC 2017); State v Copes, 165 A3d 418 (Md 2017); Commonwealth v Fulgiam, 73 NE3d 798
(Mass 2017); State v Lunsford, 141 A3d 270 (NJ 2016); State v Simmons, 143 A3d 819 (Me
2016); Tracey v State, 152 So 3d 504 (Fla 2014); Commonwealth v Augustine, 4 NE3d 846
(Mass 2014); State v Earls, 70 A3d 630 (NJ 2013). But see Zanders v State, 73 NE3d 178 (Ind
2017), vac’d, 138 S Ct 2206 (2018); Hankston v State, 517 SW3d 112 (Tex Crim App 2018);
Love v State, 543 SW3d 835 (Tex Crim App 2018); State v Jenkins, 884 NW2d 429 (Neb
2016); Marchman v State, 787 SE2d 734 (Ga 2016); Taylor v State, 371 P3d 1036 (Nev 2016);
State v Simmons, 143 A3d 819 (Me 2016); Ford v State, 477 SW3d 321 (Tex Crim App 2015);
Ross v State, 769 SE2d 43 (Ga 2015); State v Griffin, 834 NW2d 688 (Minn 2013). Compare
State v Subdiaz-Osorio, 849 NW2d 748, 768 (Wis 2014) (declining to address “whether society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable an expectation of privacy in cell phone location data,”
and determining instead that the tracking at issue in the case fell within the exigent circum-
stances exception); Commonwealth v Estabrook, 38 NE3d 231 (Mass 2015) (determining that
six hours of CSLI falls short of constitutional search requirements).
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accomplices, providing some of their mobile numbers to the FBI.111
Prosecutors used the SCA to apply for court orders to produce geo-
locational data for several suspects, including Timothy Carpenter.112
The government obtained three orders for sixteen different phones,
including “[a]ll subscriber information, toll records and call detail
records including listed and unlisted numbers dialed or otherwise
transmitted to and from [the] target telephones” as well as “cell site
information for the target telephones at call origination and at call
termination for incoming and outgoing calls.”113
The request amounted to 127 days of Carpenter’s records,114 which
was at the low end of the spectrum in terms of the length of sur-
veillance and the amount of CSLI information obtained. In United
States v Rogers, for example, a case in the Northern District of Illi-
nois, the government secured three orders for historic CSLI, with a
total of 430 days of continuous surveillance of two phones.115 InUnited
States v Jones, which arose in the Eastern District of Kentucky, the
numbers were even starker: two warrants issued in relation to thirteen
different numbers sought historical CSLI for 739 days.116
In the face of the significant inroads into privacy, a doctrinalmorass,
and open judicial frustration, the Supreme Court had little choice but
to grant certiorari. But even as it reached the right answer, it did so in a
way that failed either to inter third-party doctrine or to begin to ra-
tionalize Fourth Amendment law.
III. The Problem with Carpenter
Carpenter can best be understood as a 511 decision, in which
the Court recognized that the whole of one’s movements over a seven-
111 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2218.
112 Id.
113 Carpenter, 819 F3d at 884.
114 Id at 886.
115 United States v Rogers, 71 F Supp 3d 745 (ND Ill) (first order under § 2703(d) for
Rogers’s historic records covering June 1, 2012 to March 29, 2013 (302 days); second order
for CSLI from Curtis’s phone covering June 1, 2012 to April 10, 2013 (333 days); third order
for both phones covering March 29, 2013 to August 13, 2013 (128 more days), bringing the
total for both phones to 430 days in a row).
116 United States v Jones, 2018 WL 3212073, ∗8 (ED Ky). The Nov 16, 2015 warrant au-
thorized search and seizure in relation to thirteen different telephone numbers, including,
inter alia, historical collection of CSLI and cell tower identification records for call trans-
missions, all available text/SMS records (including contents), GPS location records, and
roaming records covering September 21, 2013 to September 30, 2015 (DTC wireless’s
records), while the March 28, 2016 warrant authorized similar search and seizure as obtained
from AT&T, which included CSLI, but not the content of communications. Id at ∗1.
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day period are protected by the Fourth Amendment. In an opinion
authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the five-Justice majority applied
Katz to establish that individuals have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in location information held by service providers, carving out
an exception to third-party doctrine.117 Justice Gorsuch, in his dis-
sent, also would have protected the information under the Fourth
Amendment, but he was deeply unsatisfied with theCourt’s rationale.
Gorsuch got it right. The decision failed to address the doctrinal
morass and created significant uncertainty for lower courts going
forward. The factors that distinguish location data apply equally well
to numerous types of digital records—including those at issue in
Miller and Smith, raising questions about whether Carpenter has over-
turned third-party doctrine in all but name. The factors employed by
the Court rely on subjective determinations, pushing the judiciary
even more firmly into a policy-making realm. In its dogged adherence
to voluntariness, itself the result of an analogical fallacy, the Court
vacillated between device-use compulsion and record-creation com-
pulsion, further obfuscating the doctrine. It provided no guidance
whatsoever as to what qualifies as a (reasonable) search of records that
now fall within the exception to the exception.
a. csli: an exception to an exception
For the majority in Carpenter, the nature of location data loomed
large. “[D]etailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled,”118 the
Court wrote, the fact that CSLI was “held by a third-party” was insuf-
ficient to deny Fourth Amendment protection.119 In short, “accessing
seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.”120
Jones played a central role in the Court’s reasoning in two ways.
First, Roberts adopted the shadow majority in the prior case as though
it had been the grounds on which it had been decided, writing, “A
majority of this Court has already recognized that individuals have
117 Carpenter, 138 S Ct 2206, 2217 (2018) (“[A]n individual maintains a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI.”).
118 Id at 2209.
119 Id at 2211.
120 Id at 2217 n 3. In Commonwealth v Estabrook, 38 NE3d 231, 237 (Mass 2015), a state
court held that where the state has complied with statutory requirements for required dis-
closure of customer communications or records, it may obtain up to six hours of person’s
CSLI without search warrant.
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a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical
movements.”121 As Justice Kennedy pointed out in his dissent, in so
doing, the Court treated the concurrences as though they were the
holding.122
Second, Carpenter picked up on language in Jones, recognizing the
degree to which location data shed light on individuals’ private lives
and the role that resource constraints have historically played (indi-
rectly) on what society was prepared to recognize as reasonable.123
Just because records were held by a third party did not negate the
character of the information: “time-stamped data provides an inti-
mate window into a person’s life, revealing not only his particular
movements, but through them his ‘familial, political, professional,
religious, and sexual associations.’”124 They could be accessed at the
touch of a button “at practically no expense,”making CSLI an “even
greater privacy concern[] than the GPS monitoring of a vehicle.”125
The issue was not just one of public activity:
A cell phone faithfully follows its owner beyond public thoroughfares and
into private residences, doctor’s offices, political headquarters, and other
potentially revealing locales. [ ] Accordingly, when the Government tracks
the location of a cell phone it achieves near perfect surveillance, as if it had
attached an ankle monitor to the phone’s user.126
These qualities, Roberts concluded, paired with factors if not unique
to CSLI then certainly characteristic of it, were sufficient to over-
come third-party doctrine.
b. whence, third-party doctrine?
To fit its decision within the existing doctrine, the Court reinter-
pretedMiller andSmith as applying a balancing test withinwhichCSLI
121 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2209–10, citing United States v Jones, 565 US 400, 430, 415 (2012)
(Alito, J, concurring and Sotomayor, J, concurring).
122 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2231 (Kennedy, J, dissenting), citing Jones, 565 US at 404.
123 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2217 (majority) (prior to digitization, it was costly to pursue suspects
for any extended period of time; resultantly, “society’s expectation has been that law enforcement
agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and
catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”).
124 Id, citing Jones, 565 US at 415 (Sotomayor, J, concurring).
125 Id.
126 Id at 2218.
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could be distinguished. For the majority, these cases were not just
about whether an individual had shared information, but also about the
nature of the documents as weighed against any legitimate expectation
of privacy in the information conveyed.
For the former, the nature of the documents, the Court concluded
that the material at issue in CSLI was different in kind than data
considered in the prior cases. Miller centered on “negotiable instru-
ments to be used in commercial transactions,” while the telephone
records in Smith provided little by way of “identifying informa-
tion.”127 In contrast, CSLI fell into its own, distinct category, iden-
tified by a number of factors: (a) the number of people implicated,128
(b) the volume of information,129 (c) the revealing nature of the in-
formation,130 (d ) the lack of resource constraints in obtaining it,131
(e) the retroactive nature of the data,132 ( f ) the near perfect recall,133
127 Id at 2219.
128 Id at 2215 (“The Government’s [reliance on third-party doctrine] fails to contend with
the seismic shifts in digital technology that made possible the tracking of not only Car-
penter’s location but also everyone else’s, not for a short period but for years and years.”); id
at 2218 (“[B]ecause location information is continually logged for all of the 400 million
devices in the United States—not just those belonging to persons who might happen to come
under investigation—this newfound tracking capacity runs against everyone.”).
129 Id at 2211–12 (observing the increasing amount of data collected, its use for business
purposes ranging from testing the network to applying roaming charges, the increasingly
dense cell site coverage, and the increasing number of ways in which the phone was used
(e.g., texting and routine data connections) that required location information).
130 Id at 2216 (CSLI “is detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled.”); id at 2218
(CSLI “gives police access to a category of information otherwise unknowable.”); id at 2220
(CSLI “implicates privacy concerns far beyond those considered in Smith and Miller.”).
131 Id at 2217 (“[P]rior to the digital age, law enforcement might have pursued a suspect for
a brief stretch, but doing so ‘for any extended period of time was difficult and costly and
therefore rarely undertaken.’ ”); id at 2217–18 (“[Now] cell phone tracking is remarkably
easy, cheap, and efficient compared to traditional investigative tools. With just the click of a
button, the Government can access each carrier’s deep repository of historical location in-
formation at practically no expense.”). See also Jones, 565 US at 417–18 (Sotomayor, J,
concurring); id at 429 (Alito, J, concurring).
132 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2218 (majority) (“[T]he Government can now travel back in time
to retrace a person’s whereabouts, subject only to the retention policies of the wireless
carriers, which currently maintain records for up to five years.”).
133 Id at 2219 (“Unlike the nosy neighbor who keeps an eye on comings and goings, they
are ever alert, and their memory is nearly infallible. There is a world of difference between
the limited types of personal information addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive
chronicle of location information casually collected by wireless carriers today. The Gov-
ernment thus is not asking for a straightforward application of the third-party doctrine, but
instead a significant extension of it to a distinct category of information.”).
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(g) the potential length of time for which information can be ob-
tained,134 and (h) the increasing precision.135
For the latter, the expectation of privacy, the Court concluded that
the user did not voluntarily convey the information in the same way
that a user provided the numbers dialed to the phone company or
financial records to a bank. The Court reasoned that mobile phones
have become a pervasive part of daily life and an integral part of
living in the modern world. Throughout the day, phones automat-
ically log onto cell towers, which means that users do not have to do
anything to have their location recorded.136 In fact, users do not have
an option not to create a record.137 Because conveying the informa-
tion is not left to the user’s discretion, there has been no assumption
of risk.138
The Court’s reinterpretation of Miller and Smith was met with
incredulity by Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Gorsuch in their dissents.
For Kennedy, relinquishing the information “to a third party was the
entire basis for concluding that the defendants in those cases lacked a
reasonable expectation of privacy.”139 The earlier cases were best read
as limiting the damage done by Katz, placing “necessary limits on the
ability of individuals to assert fourth Amendment interests in prop-
erty to which they lack a ‘requisite connection.’”140 For Kennedy and
134 Id at 2218 (noting that no probable cause is required at the outset for what turns out to
be the potential to trail someone every moment of every day for five years).
135 Id at 2218–19 (“[T]he rule the Court adopts ‘must take account of more sophisticated
systems that are already in use or in development.’ While the records in this case reflect the
state of technology at the start of the decade, the accuracy of CSLI is rapidly approaching
GPS-level precision.”).
136 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2220 (“Virtually any activity on the phone generates CSLI, in-
cluding incoming calls, texts, or e-mails and countless other data connections that a phone
automatically makes when checking for news, weather, or social media updates. Apart from
disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of
location data.”).
137 Id (“Apart from disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no way to avoid
leaving behind a trail of location data.”).
138 Id (“[I]n no meaningful sense does the user voluntarily ‘assume[ ] the risk’ of turning
over a comprehensive dossier of his physical movements.”), quoting Smith v Maryland, 442
US 735, 745 (1979).
139 Id at 2232 (Kennedy, J, dissenting). See also id at 2228 (reading Miller and Smith as
considering the “absence of property law analogues” not as part of a balancing test, but as
“dispositive of privacy expectations.”).
140 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2227, quoted and cited id at 2260 (Alito, J, dissenting). See also id
at 2259 (Alito, J, dissenting) (writing with Katz, “the sharp boundary between personal and
third-party rights was tested.”).
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Alito, Miller and Smith did not so much create a new doctrine as
rectify the uncertainty created by Katz.141
Like Kennedy and Alito, Justice Gorsuch read the foundational
third-party cases as categorically establishing that individuals have
no reasonable expectation of privacy in records held by third parties,
“even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be
used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third-
party will not be betrayed.”142 Miller and Smith did not “distinguish
between kinds of information disclosed to third parties [or] require
courts to decide whether to ‘extend’ those decisions to particular
classes of information, depending on their sensitivity.”143 They were
simply poorly decided—an example of an irrational doctrine. Gorsuch
observed, “People often do reasonably expect that information they
entrust to third parties, especially information subject to confidenti-
ality agreements, will be kept private.”144
Justice Kennedy further charged that theCourtmisapplied even its
own misinterpretation ofMiller and Smith: cell site records were not
more invasive of privacy than financial and telephone records, they
were less so.145
What persons purchase and to whom they talk might disclose how much
money they make; the political and religious organizations to which they
donate; whether they have visited a psychiatrist, plastic surgeon, abortion
clinic, or AIDS treatment center; whether they go to gay bars or straight
ones; and who are their closest friends and family members. The troves of
intimate information the Government can and does obtain using financial
records and telephone records dwarfs what can be gathered from cell-site
records.146
Kennedy was correct that the type of information at stake in financial
records can be incredibly invasive. This does not mean, though, that
the majority was wrong. It does suggest that in a digital age, CSLI is
not so unique. The test applied by the Court could apply equally well
to a range of records—including those at issue in the foundational
third-party cases. How one views the invasiveness of the information
141 See id at 2228 (Kennedy, J, dissenting); id at 2260 (Alito, J, dissenting).
142 United States v Miller, 425 US 435, 443 (1976), cited and quoted in Carpenter, 138 S Ct
at 2262 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
143 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2262 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
144 Id.
145 Id at 2232 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).
146 Id.
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has a lot to do with perspective, underscoring the subjectivity inherent
in the Court’s approach and illustrating why it will be so difficult to
implement going forward.
1. Broadly applicable. The Carpentermajority claimed that CSLI is
different from other kinds of information held by third parties. In its
effort to avoid overturning third-party doctrine, however, the ma-
jority failed to acknowledge the applicability of its approach to many
types of consumer data. The multifactor test applies just as easily to
telephony metadata collection which, ostensibly, is the same type of
information at issue in Smith, raising questions about whether Car-
penter actually overturned third-party doctrine.
Let’s start with the number of people implicated, one of the de-
fining factors of CSLI. The same is true of telephonymetadata. There
are 265.9 million mobile phone users in the United States.147 These
devices generate detailed information about who is in contact with
each user, implicating hundreds of millions of people.
Like location data, the volume of communications at issue is enor-
mous and rapidly increasing. In addition to expanding mobile phone
use, approximately 224.3 million mobile phone users have Smart-
phones that run sophisticated applications, which provide further ways
for users to communicatewith each other.148 The top app, Facebook, is
on 78 percent of all Smartphones.149 The company has a tremendous
reach: in October 2018, the Pew Research Center reported that ap-
proximately two-thirds of all adults in the United States use Face-
book.150 Users can send and receive messages to anyone on the net-
work using Facebook Messenger, the mobile phone’s browser, the
Facebook SMS Service, or third-party apps.151 The company collects
147 MaXab, How Many Cell Phone Subscribers in the US 2018 (Media Tech Reviews, Mar 20,
2018), online at http://www.mediatechreviews.com/how-many-cell-phone-subscribers-the
-us. This number is expected to increase. Share of Americans Using a Personal Cell Phone Users
in 2018, by Age (Statista), online at https://www.statista.com/statistics/231612/number-of-cell
-phone-users-usa.
148 Smartphone (Techopedia), online at https://www.techopedia.com/definition/2977/smart
phone.
149 MaXab, How Many Cell Phone Subscribers (cited in note 147).
150 John Gramlich, 8 Facts About Americans and Facebook (Pew Research Center, Oct 24,
2018), online at http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/24/facts-about-americans
-and-facebook (reporting that 68 percent of American adults use Facebook, with 74 percent
visiting the site daily).
151 Six Ways to Send Facebook Messages Without Messenger (Dr. Fone), online at https://
drfone.wondershare.com/facebook/send-facebook-messages-without-messenger.html.
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logs of all communications—including data on individuals who do
not even have a Facebook account, gleaned from their inclusion in
users’ contact lists.152 Facebook is only one company in a rapidly
growing social media market in which some 3 billion people world-
wide (approximately one-third of the population on earth) are ex-
pected to take part by 2021.153
The information that can be extracted from the associated tele-
phony metadata can be far more invasive than location data. Even
one-off communications can reveal hobbies, interests, relationships,
and beliefs. Patterns impart degrees of intimacy. Using network
analytics, relationships can be mapped into nodes and networks and
analyzed.154 Communities previously hidden from view can be de-
tected.155 Power structures and levels of influence can be identified.156
Social networks, of course, are not static. Future interactions, col-
152 Gabriel J. X. Dance, Michael LaFoergia, and Nicholas Confessore, As Facebook Raised a
Privacy Wall, It Carved an Opening for Tech Giants (NY Times, Dec 18, 2018), online at
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/technology/facebook-privacy.html?actionpclick&
modulepTop%20Stories&pgtypepHomepage; Kurt Wagner, This Is How Facebook Collects
Data on You Even if You Don’t Have an Account (Recode, Apr 20, 2018), online at https://www
.recode.net/2018/4/20/17254312/facebook-shadow-profiles-data-collection-non-users-mark
-zuckerberg.
153 Mobile Social Media—Statistics & Facts (Statista), online at https://www.statista.com
/topics/2478/mobile-social-networks.
154 SeeGreg Statell,How the NSAUses Social Network Analysis toMap Terrorist Networks (Digital
Tonto, June 12, 2013), online at https://www.digitaltonto.com/2013/how-the-nsa-uses-social
-network-analysis-to-map-terrorist-networks; Amir Gandomi and Murtaza Haider, Beyond the
Hype: Big Data Concepts, Methods, and Analytics, 35 Intl J Info Management 137 (2015); Julia
Heidemann, Mathias Klier, and Florian Probst, Online Social Networks: A Survey of a Global
Phenomenon, Computer Networks, 56 Computer Networks 3866 (2012).
155 Charu C. Aggarwal, An Introduction to Social Network Data Analytics (Springer, 2011).
See also Community Detection Algorithms (Neo4j), online at https://neo4j.com/docs/graph
-algorithms/current/algorithms/community.
156 Degree centrality counts how many neighbors a node within a network has. Degree
Centrality (Network Science), online at https://www.sci.unich.it/~francesc/teaching/network
/degree.html. Betweenness centrality reveals how information flows through a network—that
is, nodes that provide a bridge between different parts of the network. The Betweenness
Centrality Algorithm (Neo4j), online at https://neo4j.com/docs/graph-algorithms/current
/algorithms/betweenness-centrality. Closeness centrality indicates the most efficient spread
of information through a network, that is, how close they are to the relevant nodes. The
Closeness Centrality Algorithm (Neo4j), online at https://neo4j.com/docs/graph-algorithms
/current/algorithms/closeness-centrality. Eigenvector centrality looks at the importance of a
node in terms of the importance of nodes with which it is linked. It is a way of ranking
importance in a network. Eigenvector Centrality (Network Science), online at https://www.sci
.unich.it/~francesc/teaching/network/eigenvector.html. See also Lei Tang and Huan Liu,
Community Detection and Mining in Social Media, in Jiawei Han et al, eds, Synthesis Lectures on
Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery 1–137 (Morgan and Claypool, 2010).
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laboration, and influence can be estimated, based on latent data.157
Using regression equations and machine learning, observers can pre-
dict what people are likely to do, even when the subjects themselves are
not aware of their patterns.158 The more information that is collected,
the more accurate such predictions become.159
Massive amounts of data are being produced by social media com-
panies such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp. That information
already has been used to predict influenza, stock market trends, and
customer attitudes, as well as spiritual beliefs and political views.160
Over the past five years, there has been an explosion in scholarly ar-
ticles and book chapters focused on exploiting social network analytics
in the criminal context as well.161 The technique can be effective in
identifying critical nodes, which law enforcement can then target to
disrupt criminal enterprises.162
157 See David Liben-Nowell and Jon Kleinberg, The Link Prediction Problem for Social Net-
works, in Donald Kraft, ed, Proceedings of the Twelfth International Conference on Information and
Knowledge Management 556 (ACM, 2003).
158 See Jianqing Fan, Fang Han, and Han Liu, Challenges of Big Data Analysis, 1 Natl Sci
Rev 293, 293 (2014).
159 Id at 297–98.
160 Id at 296–97 .
161 See, for example, Giulia Berlosconi, Social Network Analysis and Crime Prevention, in Benoit
Le Clerc and Ernesto U. Savano, eds, Crime Prevention in the 21st Century 129 (Springer, 2017);
MorganBurcher, Social Network Analysis as a Tool for Criminal Intelligence, 21Trends inOrganized
Crime 278 (2018); David A. Bright, Catherine Greenhill, and Natalya Levenkova, Dismantling
Criminal Networks: CanNode Attributes Play a Role?, in CarloMorselli, ed,Crime and Networks 148
(Routledge, 2013); Francesco Calderoni, Identifying Mafia Bosses from Meeting Attendance, in
Anthony J. Masys, ed,Networks and Network Analysis for Defence and Security 27 (Springer, 2014);
Francesco Calderoni, Predicting Organized Crime Leaders, in Gisela Bichler and Aili E. Malm, eds,
Disrupting Criminal Networks: Network Analysis in Crime Prevention 89 (First Forum, 2015); David
Décary-Hétu, Information Exchange Paths in IRCHacking Chat Rooms, in CarloMorselli, ed,Crime
and Networks 218 (Routledge, 2014); Paul A. C. Duijn and Peter P. H. M. Klerks, Social Network
Analysis Applied to Criminal Networks: Recent Developments in Dutch Law Enforcement, in Anthony J.
Masys, ed, Networks and Network Analysis for Defence and Security 121 (Springer, 2014); Jenny C.
Piquette, Chris M. Smith, and Andrew V. Papachristos, Social Network Analysis of Urban Street
Gangs, in Gerben Bruinsma and David Weisburd, eds, Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal
Justice 4981 (Springer, 2014); David A. Bright et al,NetworksWithinNetworks: UsingMultiple Link
Types to Examine Network Structure and Identify Key Actors in a Drug Trafficking Operation, 16
Global Crime 219 (2015).
162 Burcher, 21 Trends in Organized Crime at 278 (cited in note 161). Instead of focusing
on low-level criminals, for instance, law enforcement could use metadata to identify the key
members of Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), a violent criminal gang formed in the 1980s in Los
Angeles. They could then call those individuals in for questioning, subject them to more
detailed scrutiny, put out false information about them to undermine their position within
the organization, or prosecute them in an effort to imprison them and thus interrupt the
network.
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Like location data, the resource constraints in obtaining telephony
metadata and subjecting it to targeted queries or sophisticated algo-
rithms are rapidly diminishing. In the past, it might not have been
possible to recordmost, or even all, of an individual’s relationships and
communications.Now, not only is it possible, but big data andmassive
computing power have put technology in hyperdrive. What might
have taken days, or even months, of analysis, can now be done at the
push of a button.
All of this information, moreover, like location data, is retroactive
in that it relates to communications in the past. And while CSLI pro-
vides near-perfect recall, telephony metadata reproduce exactly what
happened, recording at precisely what time, on which date, an indi-
vidual was in contact with which number or entity. And it is available
for weeks, months, or even years at a time. The only limit is that of the
cell phone provider or the app itself.
By all the factors laid out by the Court in Carpenter, pen register
and trap and trace data prove equally, if not even more, invasive than
location information. If the intent of the Court is to be believed (i.e.,
to restore some sort of equilibrium between society and law en-
forcement), then such records must be included in the exception to
the exception. A similar argument could be made about banking
records, which were at issue in Miller.163
InCarpenter, theCourt tried to draw a distinction between location
information and telephony metadata based on voluntariness.164 This
163 Banking records implicate nearly every American. The volume of information held by
banks is enormous and can be extremely revealing in terms of individuals’ private lives. As
technology has progressed, fewer and fewer resource constraints exist for obtaining, and
analyzing, significant amounts of data. Banking records are just as precise as telephony
metadata, and they can be obtained for activity that occurred decades before. As with mobile
telephones, it is not an option in the current age not to have a bank account; nor is it vol-
untary, in any sense of the word, not to confide certain information to banks—particularly
information that is required by statute. Banking records look remarkably like location data, in
terms of the factors laid out by the Court in Carpenter. See also Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2233
(Kennedy, J, dissenting) (“Financial records are of vast scope. Banks and credit card com-
panies keep a comprehensive account of almost every transaction an individual makes on a
daily basis. . . . And the decision whether to transact with banks and credit card companies is
no more or less voluntary than the decision whether to use a cell phone.”); id at 2224 (arguing
that the Court has drawn an “unprincipled and unworkable line between cell-site records on
the one hand and financial and telephonic records on the other.”).
164 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2220 (majority). See also Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2227–30
(Kennedy, J, dissenting) (noting that by voluntarily conveying information to the respective
companies, the defendants in Miller and Smith “ ‘assumed the risk that the information would
be divulged to police,’ ” and arguing that Carpenter similarly lacked any reasonable expectation
of privacy in CSLI).
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assertion, however, does not survive scrutiny. For the distinction to
hold, one of two things would have to be true: either having a phone
must be optional, or providing the numbers to the company must be
at the user’s discretion. Neither is accurate. As for the former, 99.28 per-
cent of adults aged eighteen to twenty-nine have a mobile phone.165 As
the Court recognized in Riley, the devices have become an indis-
pensable part of living in society. In regard to the latter, users cannot
mask the numbers that they call. Companies must have this infor-
mation to connect them to the other party, and vice versa. Providing it
to the company is not voluntary in any sense of the word.166
In sum, the factors considered by the Court as (ostensibly) unique
to CSLI apply equally well to telephony metadata—and banking
data167—making the claim that the Court left Miller and Smith un-
touched ring somewhat hollow.168 Applying the Carpenter test, it is
difficult to see any distinction between many types of third-party
documents.169With this inmind, JusticeAlito’s critique, that theCourt’s
“revolutionary” holding fractured the “pillars of Fourth Amendment
law,” seems about right.170
2. Unknowable. Not only do many different kinds of digital records
meet the test laid out in Carpenter—including the records at issue in
the foundational third-party cases—but it is impossible to say with
any certainty how the courts will apply the logic adopted. The Court’s
approach requires a case-by-case analysis in which unanswerable ques-
tions are presented. Because it is based on a bad analogy and highly
indeterminate concepts, such as voluntariness and reasonableness, it
will prove difficult to implement in any sort of consistent manner.171
165 Share of AmericansUsing a Personal Cell PhoneUsers in 2018, byAge (Statista) (cited in note 147).
166 A third possibility might be that telephone users voluntarily call certain numbers. This
argument, though, is at odds with the Court’s acknowledgment in Riley that a phone is
concomitant to living in society. It makes no sense to then turn around and say that it is not
actually necessary to use it to be part of that society.
167 See note 163.
168 As Justice Gorsuch laments, Carpenter only made matters worse, placing “Smith and
Miller on life support and supplement[ing] them with a new and multilayered inquiry that
seems to be only Katz-squared.” Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2272 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
169 The same could be said of educational assessments, employment records, and the like.
So, too, does it apply to other forms of metadata, such as IP addresses, websites visited, or text
and email contacts.
170 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2247 (Alito, J, dissenting).
171 See also id at 2261 (recognizing that the reasoning of the majority will require the Court
to take every case and subject each type of information to qualifications, further entangling
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
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a) Which records? Like many of the lower courts that confronted
CSLI, the Carpenter court emphasized voluntary assumption of risk.
In doing so, it perpetuated the false analogy between informant doc-
trine and third-party business records. As explained above, this con-
flation subordinates the constitutional right to security in “papers”;
ignores the difference between admitting illegal activity to a cocon-
spirator and engaging in a legal, contractual relationship; assumes
consent for a limited purpose means consent to government surveil-
lance; and sidesteps the extent to which commercial relations are an
essential part of ordinary life. It is an awful analogy.
The Court discussed two kinds of potentially compelled (or vol-
untary) actions: use of a mobile phone, and the generation of location
recordswhile using the phone.172 It did not provide guidelines for how
to think about these two categories going forward; nor did it address
their relative importance or how to gauge greater or lesser degrees of
compulsion.
Consider, first, what could be termed device-use compulsion. Not-
ing that carrying a phone is not an option in the contemporary context,
the Court neglected to enquire (a) whether other mobile devices are
“voluntarily” used, or (b) whether records connected to the tech-
nologies contained on (specifically) mobile telephones fall within the
exception.
For (a), a colorable case could be made that many other kinds of
nontelephonic mobile devices are critical in the contemporary en-
vironment. The computer on which I am writing this article is es-
sential tomywork. Itwould be almost impossible to undertakemodern
legal scholarship without one. The same could be said of the use of
computers in many different fields. As a matter of private use, com-
puters are used for everything from shopping, entertainment, and
scheduling dates with friends, to cooking, buying bus, train, and plane
tickets, and planning vacations. They have become a pervasive part of
ordinary life. In 2016, the American Community Survey determined
that 89 percent of American households have a computer, making it,
in the Census Bureau’s estimation, “a common feature of everyday
172 Although I do not here go into detail, it is worth noting that the way in which the Court
referred to compulsion versus voluntary action departs significantly from philosophical
treatment of these areas. In Carpenter, what the Court appears to mean by these concepts
relates to technical requirements of participation in modern society.
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life.”173 Under Carpenter, does this mean that Fourth Amendment
protection extends to records associated with computers?
For that matter, are all electronic devices, which store digital in-
formation, (in)voluntary in a modern era? If not, how do we distin-
guish between those that are and those that are not? The Court
provides no basis on which to calculate which devices are coerced by
the circumstances of life. What level of necessity is required? How
pervasive must they be? How will voluntariness be determined? By
the number of people using the technology? By the percentage of the
population? Carpenter clarifies none of this.
Perhaps, turning to (b), voluntariness has to do not with the phone
itself, but with the specific function the phone performs. If so, then it
is not clear if the Court’s reasoning is limited to the traditional place
of the phone in contacting others in society—for personal or business
purposes—or whether it has something to do with the types of tech-
nologies typically contained on the telephone. For the former, the
primary use is found in the function of the device as a phone. So, in
order to exist in modern life (i.e., to be part of society), perhaps the
underlying theory is that we must carry one in order to be in contact
with others. Or perhaps it is just use of the phone when it operates as
a tracking device that qualifies for protection. But if that is the case,
then all photographs that include geolocational metadata, and ap-
plications like Yelp, Flixter, or Foursquare, which rely on location
information, also are protected. What if the voluntariness is not
limited to location data? If use of the mobile telephone is not vol-
untary (under Riley and Carpenter), for reasons related to taking part
in society, then wouldn’t this encompass other functions the phone
performs, such as social media?
And who is to make the voluntariness determination? From Car-
penter, it appears that the Court has this responsibility. But judges’
experiences will shape the answer. For some, social media may be a
complete mystery, not at all part of their daily interactions. For
others, Facebookmay be an indispensable part of their social life. For
those of a younger generation, who see Facebook as something that
their grandparents do, their world may revolve around Snapchat,
Instagram, and YouTube. For them, participation is not voluntary. It
173 Camille Ryan, Computer and Internet Use in the United States: 2016 (US Census Bureau,
Aug 8, 2018), online at https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications
/2018/acs/ACS-39.pdf.
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is required for participating in, and being part of, society.174 Justices
may see it quite differently. The result will further entrench the ju-
diciary in policy determinations.
Perhaps what the Court meant in Carpenter was that voluntariness
relates not to the device, but to the production of records themselves,
a sort of record-creation compulsion: that is, users do not have a
meaningful choice whether to convey their location to a service pro-
vider.175 But this is a distinctly odd way to think about what one does
when one uses a mobile device. The argument is that by having the
device, you are locked into transmitting your location to the internet
service provider (ISP) to get service. But by using the device in cer-
tain ways—ways equally central to the role of the device in modern
society—you also are locked into transmitting all sorts of different
kinds of data.
Consider, for instance, Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, which are
dynamically assigned to a device when you go online. When you are
at home, it is assigned by your ISP. But that number can change as
quickly as a power outage, when the server is turned off. As soon as
you leave home and use a different network to go online, a new (tem-
porary) IP address is assigned.176 You can try to mask your IP address
by using a Virtual Private Network (VPN) Service, the Onion Router
(Tor) (a network that allows users to disguise their identity by using
multiple servers and encryption), a proxy server, or free/publicWiFi.177
But most users are not this sophisticated and are left with the default
IP address, which reveals their location.
So, underCarpenter, does this mean that IP addresses are included?
If so, then how about Uniform Resource Locators (URLs)? By using
a browser to visit web pages, you may (unwittingly) record the URLs
in your browser cache, the operating system cache, the router cache,
and the ISP cache.178 Are you providing that information voluntarily
or not? If the carrying of the phone is not voluntary, and the access
174 See discussion in note 172.
175 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2220 (majority).
176 See, for example, My IP Address Is: (WhatIsMyIPAddress.com), online at https://whatis
myipaddress.com.
177 How to Hide Your IP Address (WhatIsMyIPAddress.com), online at https://whatismy
ipaddress.com/hide-ip.
178 Maneesha Wijesinghe,What Happens When You Type a URL in the Browser and Press Enter?
(Medium, Apr 25, 2017), online at https://medium.com/@maneesha.wijesinghe1/what-happens
-when-you-type-an-url-in-the-browser-and-press-enter-bb0aa2449c1a.
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it provides to the online world similarly compelled, then it seems as
though it ought to be considered within the domain of the Fourth
Amendment. As in the case of CSLI, it is simply a by-product of
actions you take in the real world—in this case, the decision to go
online.
With so many different questions left unanswered by Carpenter
about how to think about device-use compulsion and record-
production compulsion, it will be up to the courts to answer them and
to gauge voluntariness—entrenching courts ever more firmly in the
policy-making realm and leading to unpredictable results.
b) When is a search reasonable? In Carpenter, the Court held that
seven days of CSLI required a warrant. For Justice Kennedy, this
(apparently arbitrary) distinction was “illogical” and would “frustrate
principled application of the Fourth Amendment.”179 Worse, the
Court had collapsed its determination that obtaining CSLI consti-
tuted a search and the analysis of whether or not it was “reason-
able.”180 For Kennedy, the proper approach would have been to re-
mand the case to address the “important and difficult issues” that
marked the second query.181 Underlying his critique was the Court’s
failure to address the role of technology not just in determining
whether a search had occurred, but whether it was one that society
was prepared to recognize as reasonable. That lack of precision re-
garding the role of technology raised myriad questions that will fur-
ther frustrate efforts to implement the decision in a reliable manner.
The majority in Carpenter went some length to note that “seismic
shifts in digital” technologies had created CSLI—a form of infor-
mation hitherto unknown.182 When confronted by “new concerns
wrought by digital technology,” the Court had to be careful not to
reflexively extend precedent.183 The majority was critical of the gov-
179 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2224 (Kennedy, J, dissenting) (“[T]he Government crosses a
constitutional line when it obtains a court’s approval to issue a subpoena for more than six days
of cell-site records in order to determine whether a person was within several hundred city
blocks of a crime scene.”).
180 Id at 2235 (“Having concluded . . . that the Government searched Carpenter when it
obtained cell-site records from his cell phone service providers, the proper resolution of this
case should have been to remand for the Court of Appeals to determine in the first instance
whether the search was reasonable.”).
181 Id.
182 Id at 2219 (majority).
183 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2222.
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ernment, and Kennedy, for failing to grasp the implications of the
“new technology.”184 There was a “world of difference between the
limited types of personal information addressed in Smith and Miller
and the exhaustive chronicle of location information” now avail-
able.185 The Court also had to be mindful “of more sophisticated
[technologies] that were already in use or in development.”186
The majority’s language suggested that the novelty of the tech-
nology mattered—that is, the extent to which the technology in ques-
tion departed from previous circumstances.187 It was not clear whether
the chief complaint was the impact of new technologies or the creation
of new types of records.188 Neither, as a limitation going forward, is
persuasive.
While the factors laid out in Carpenter underscored the impact of
one “new” technology that had resulted in near-universal 24/7 location
tracking, in other situations, perhaps the prior limitation is merely one
of storage capacity, or battery life—or whether information is shared,
an algorithm created, or an old technology applied to a new context.
Perhaps it has nothing to do with the novelty of the technology in
question.
If it is only “new” technologies, how do we draw the line? This is a
hard question. The Carpenter court stated, for example, that its de-
cision did not reach traditional cameras.189 But a camera with still
image capabilities and limited memory is a different animal than one
with video capabilities and virtually unlimitedmemory. Still more are
these different from cameras with infrared vision, remote rotation,
and powerful zoom functions, or that capture not just video, but audio
as well. Yet more distant are cameras paired with biometric identifi-
cation systems, or linked to extensive online databases providing de-
184 Id at 2219.
185 Id.
186 Id at 2218. See also id at 2223 (“As Justice Brandeis explained in his famous dissent, the
Court is obligated . . . to ensure that the ‘progress of science’ does not erode Fourth
Amendment protections.”) (citations omitted).
187 See, for example, Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2217 (comparing tailing a suspect “[p]rior to the
digital age” to the contemporary use of technology).
188 On the one hand, the Court focused on the technology itself, as well as the state of the
technology. Id at 2219–20. On the other hand, it observed “a world of difference between the
limited types of personal information addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive
chronicle of location information casually collected by wireless carries today,” referring to
CSLI as “an entirely different species of business record.” Id at 2219, 2222.
189 Id at 2220.
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tailed, personally identifiable information. Even further are such
cameras mounted on a drone and not tied to one place. Nevertheless,
the government considers all of these to be one technology, at times
not even deigning to issue a new privacy impact assessment when the
nature of the recordings, capacity, or capabilities change.190
Or perhaps the Court, applying a rule of functional equivalence,
would only include technologies that allow for the constructive search
of what was traditionally found to be unreasonable when subject to a
physical search.TheCourt has used this approach in related areas.The
protections of the home, for instance, extend to anywhere that func-
tions in the samemanner, regardless of whether it amounts to an actual
“house.”191
Functional equivalence has been particularly important for giving
courts latitude to take account of new technologies. Air travel did not
exist at the founding, but as individuals began using airports, the
Court extended the border exception to the “functional equivalent”
of the border: interior airports employed as ports of entry.192 Where
technology has made it possible to conduct a search that otherwise
would require entry and thereby exposes the home to inspection, the
Court again has applied a rule of functional equivalence.193 Accord-
190 The Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Investigation operates the Next
Generation Identification–Interstate Photo System (NGI-IPS) and an internal unit called Facial
Analysis, Comparison and Evaluation (FACE) Services. Although DOJ developed a Privacy
Impact Assessment in 2008 for NGI-IPS, it did not update it as the system integrated new
technologies, nor did it publish a PIA on FACE Services. USGovernment Accountability Office,
Face Recognition Technology: FBI Should Better Ensure Privacy and Accuracy (May 16, 2016), online at
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-267. See also Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap,
Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97Minn L Rev
407 (2012) (noting the absence of PIAs despite the addition of new technologies).
191 See, for example, United States v Dunn, 480 US 294, 301 n 4 (1987) (defining curtilage as
an area “harbor[ing] those intimate activities associated with domestic life and the privacies of
the home.”); United States v McDonald, 335 US 451 (1948) (regarding a locked common area
of a rooming house to be within the Fourth Amendment).
192 Torres v Puerto Rico, 442 US 465 (1979) (holding that the search of an individual arriving in
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico from the United States did not satisfy Fourth Amendment
requirements because there was no functional equivalent to an international border of the
United States); Almeida-Sanchez v United States, 413 US 266, 273 (1973) (“[A] search of the
passengers and cargo of an airplane arriving at a St. Louis airport after a nonstop flight from
Mexico City would clearly be the functional equivalent of a border search.”).
193 See also Barnett and Bernick, 107 Georgetown L J at 3 (cited in note 10) (arguing for a
commitment to “the functions, purposes, goals, [and] aims” of constitutional clauses in
ascertaining the meaning of the Constitution); Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter,
Harv J L & Tech at 34 (forthcoming 2019), online at https://osf.io/preprints/lawarxiv/bsedj
/download (articulating a rule of technological equivalence as: “The Court in the past has
386 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW [2018
ingly, in United States v Knotts, the Court considered a beeper tracked
along a public road to fall outside Fourth Amendment protections; but
then, inUnited States v Karo, the Court held that the moment at which
a beeper crossed the threshold, a search had occurred.194 Whether or
not law enforcement actually entered the domicile, they could infer
that the can of ether being tracked was inside.195 Similarly, in Kyllo,
theCourt determined that the use of a thermal imaging device to read
the heat signatures of exterior walls constituted a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.196 Justice Scalia, writing for the
Court, rejected the government’s argument that it was constitutional
because the thermal device did not uncover “intimate details.”Using
it violated a categorical protection: “In the home, our cases show, all
details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from
prying government eyes.”197 Lower courts have adopted the same
approach for other technologies that reveal what happens inside the
home.198
In Carpenter, the Court favorably cited back to Kyllo, acknowl-
edging “[a]s technology has enhanced the Government’s capacity to
encroachupon areas normally guarded from inquisitive eyes,” theCourt
has tried to ensure the protections guaranteed at the founding.199 In
dicta, the Court went on to accept that the examination of digitized
letters would constitute a search. It considered email “a sensible ex-
held that information in a particular, traditional privacy context is protected by the Fourth
Amendment. A technology produces information that is a modern-day equivalent to the
information produced in the traditional context of step one. The information in the modern
context is also protected by the Fourth Amendment.”).
194 United States v Karo, 468 US 705, 715 (1984) (“[H]ad a DEA agent thought it useful to
enter the Taos residence to verify that the ether was actually in the house and had he done so
surreptitiously and without a warrant, there is little doubt that he would have engaged in an
unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. . . . [T]he result is the
same where, without a warrant, the Government surreptitiously employs an electronic device
to obtain information that it could not have obtained by observation from outside the cur-
tilage of the house.”); Knotts, 460 US at 281 (“A person traveling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another.”).
195 Karo, 468 US at 714–15. See also Kyllo v United States, 533 US 27, 36 (2001) (Scalia, J,
for the majority) (stating that in Karo “the police ‘inferred’ from the activation of a beeper
that a certain can of ether was in the home.”).
196 Kyllo, 533 US at 29.
197 Id at 37–38. See also Florida v Jardines, 569 US 1 (2013).
198 See Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v Naperville, 900 F3d 521 (7th Cir 2018).
199 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2214.
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ception,” an example of “the modern-day equivalents of an individ-
ual’s own ‘papers’ or ‘effects.’”200
The challenge in understanding Carpenter in light of the rule of
functional equivalence is that Miller and Smith eviscerated the pro-
tections afforded to “papers.” Yet it appears that Carpenter eliminated
third-party doctrine in all but name. So, going forward, if we apply the
rule of functional equivalence, how do we understand “papers,” or for
that matter, “effects,” in a digital age? Do text messages count? Or
instant messages? Or chats in multiplayer online games?
Perhaps the technologies that allow for constructive search of
traditional categories provide a minimum. If so, how far out does the
new rule go? Again, in dicta, the Court noted that whatever rule the
Court adopts must take account of increasingly sophisticated tech-
nologies.201 But how sophisticated do they need to be? Which (new)
technologies constitute a search, but do not fall afoul of the reason-
ableness determination? How is the decision to be reached? In col-
lapsing its analysis, the Court failed to provide a reliable way for the
lower courts to draw a line, even as it cemented them into a policy-
making realm.202
IV. Residual Property Rights
While Carpenter unquestionably represents a departure from
familiar doctrinal landmarks, it leaves us at somewhat of a loss. How
should we chart a future course concerning personal, digital infor-
mation held by companies in a post-Katz, post-Miller and Smith,
post-Carpenter era?
Consistent with the previous discussion, the voluntary assumption
of risk is a nonstarter. Continued use of it will confound efforts to
provide consistency across the circuits. In addition to the analogical
fallacies at work in the decision, Carpenter fails to provide guidance
on device-use compulsion and record-creation compulsion, both of
200 Id at 2222, citing and quoting id at 2230 (Kennedy, J, dissenting), citing United States v
Warshak, 631 F3d 266, 283–88 (6th Cir 2010).
201 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2218–19 (majority).
202 Gorsuch raised myriad further questions that bedevil the holding. See Carpenter, 138 S Ct
at 2266–67 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting) (concluding, “In the end, our lower court colleagues are left
with two amorphous balancing tests, a series of weighty and incommensurable principles to
consider in them, and a few illustrative examples that seem little more than the product of
judicial intuition.”).
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which, in any event, rely on complex policy determinations. This ap-
proach further draws courts into value judgments, running the risk that
the public will lose confidence in the judiciary.
No better does the “novel technology” approach fare. As argued
above, it is beset by hard questions, including how to understandwhat
counts as a “new” technology. As digitization becomes widespread,
this approach will become less and less relevant. New forms of infor-
mation that previously did not even exist will become available, which
implicates interests ostensibly protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Given these potentially insuperable difficulties, the judiciary ought
seriously to consider returning to constitutional first principles: a
property-rights-based approach. As the Supreme Court observed,
“One virtue of the Fourth Amendment’s property-rights baseline is
that it keeps easy cases easy.”203 Just as the Court in Karo and Kyllo
adopted a rule of functional equivalence in regard to the home, it can
embrace a similar approach to papers. A central question then becomes
which digital documents come within constitutional protections. A
property-rights approach helps to answer that question. This is the
path favored by Gorsuch in Carpenter.204 He drew on bailment and
positive law, asking what kind of legal interest would be sufficient to
generate ownership rights and what sources of law would help to de-
termine the answer.205 In the balance of this article, I identify important
reasons why the Court should consider adopting a property-rights
approach.
a. generation, ownership, and possession
As the dissents in Carpenter observed, the Fourth Amendment has
at its core a right in one’s own property that stems from the inclusion
203 Florida v Jardines, 569 US 1, 12 (2013).
204 Gorsuch envisioned three possible futures: the Court could doggedly hold to precedent,
it could reevaluate the world post-Katz, or it could chart a new course. Carpenter, 138 S Ct at
2262 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting). The first amounted to “A doubtful application of Katz that lets
the government search almost whatever it wants whenever it wants.” Id at 2264. The second
was problematic, as the issue was Katz in the first place. Id. The third offered the most
promising way forward. See id at 2267–72.
205 Id at 2268. See also William Baude and James Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth
Amendment, 129 Harv L Rev 1821 (2016) (arguing that a Fourth Amendment search only
occurs where a private party could not lawfully perform the action undertaken by the gov-
ernment); Richard Re, The Positive Law Floor, 129 Harv L Rev F 313 (2016) (arguing in jux-
taposition to Baude and Stern that positive law creates a floor, not a ceiling, on Fourth
Amendment protections).
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of “their persons, houses, papers, and effects.”206 The text does not
refer to a right exercised in relation to the property of others.207 It
thus requires the Court to ask whose property was searched.
This approach is consistent withKatz, which, as the SupremeCourt
has recognized, did not extinguish the role of property rights in the
Fourth Amendment.208 Even the “legitimation” of Katz’s “expecta-
tions” test(s) “must have a source outside the Fourth Amendment,
either by reference to concepts of real or personal property or to un-
derstandings that are recognized and permitted by society.”209 From
this, we can conclude that even under existing precedent, ownership
rights still matter.
Can individuals have an ownership interest in digital documents or
records? The answer here is plainly yes. Federal statutes routinely
treat “data,” “digital data,” “digital content,” and “digital assets” as
property.210 The same is true at a state level: since 2013, forty-six
states have enacted laws governing access to digital assets ranging
from email, social media accounts, and microblogging to electroni-
cally stored information.211 State statutes also create a private right of
action to redress the unauthorized collection, retention, disclosure,
206 US Const, Amend IV; Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2260 (Alito, J, dissenting) (The Fourth
Amendment protects “their persons, houses, papers, and effects”—not those of others) (em-
phasis in original); id at 2235 (Thomas, J, dissenting) (“The Fourth Amendment guarantees
individuals the right to be secure from unreasonable searches of ‘their persons, houses, papers,
and effects.’ ”) (emphasis in original); id at 2227 (Kennedy, J, dissenting) (“the Fourth
Amendment’s protections must remain tethered to the text of that Amendment, which, again,
protects only a person’s own ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects.’ ”).
207 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2227 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).
208 Rakas v Illinois, 439 US 128, 143–44 n 12 (1978) (“Expectations of privacy protected by
the Fourth Amendment . . . need not be based on a common-law interest in real or personal
property, or on the invasion of such an interest. These ideas were rejected [in]. . . Katz. [ ] But
by focusing on legitimate expectations of privacy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the
Court has not altogether abandoned use of property concepts in determining the presence or
absence of the privacy interests protected by that Amendment.”). See also Carpenter, 138 S Ct
at 2227 (Kennedy, J, dissenting) (writing, “ ‘property concepts’ are . . . fundamental ‘in de-
termining the presence or absence of the privacy interests protected by’ ” the Fourth
Amendment and that even in Katz, the property-based concept remained).
209 Rakas, 439 US at 144 n 12.
210 See, for example, Other Digital Content (Copyright.gov), online at https://www.copyright
.gov/registration/other-digital-content; Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (HIPPA), Pub L No 104-191, 110 Stat 1936.
211 Access to Digital Assets of Decedents (National Conference of State Legislatures, Dec 3,
2018), online at http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology
/access-to-digital-assets-of-decedents.aspx.
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and destruction of biometric data.212 As a matter of Supreme Court
jurisprudence, the rule of functional equivalence applies: at a mini-
mum, the types of matters that historically would have been protected,
if digitized, fall within the Fourth Amendment. Scholars, too, appear
to be nearly universal in their agreement.213 To the extent, then, that
third-party doctrine eviscerated a foundational right to security of
one’s digital personal or commercial papers, it undermined rights se-
cured at the founding.
Papers encompass the intimacies of life that arise, at least in part,
from an individual’s actions and decisions: writing a letter, keeping a
diary, dictating a memo, engaging in business transactions, and going
about one’s daily business. The fact that they are held on parchment
or online matters naught. Such documents would not exist but for the
actions of the owner. The (traditional) position of the letter-writer,
diary-keeper, or individual engaged in commercial activity matters.
Digital records mirror what happens in the world—what people think,
say, do, and believe. They arise from the right-holder’s actions.
The question, “who owns this information?” relates not just to the
concept of ownership itself, but also to the relationship between the
holder of the right and others. This leads to a critical insight: If it is up
to an individual to determine with whom information generated by them is
shared, then that person holds the original right. An individual could not
contract to provide the information without power over the data.214
Under such circumstances, the right at issue can be understood, at
least in part, according to the actions of the right-holder.
212 See, for example, the Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq, which
was recently upheld in Rosenbach v Six Flags Entertainment Corp., 2019 WL 323902 (Ill).
213 See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 Stan L Rev 1125, 1130 (ar-
guing that people think about personal data as property); Megan Blass, The New Data Mar-
ketplace: Protecting Personal Data, Electronic Communications, and Individual Privacy in the Age of
Mass Surveillance through a Return to a Property-Based Approach to the Fourth Amendment,
42 Hastings Const L Q 577, 592 (2015) (“Personal data and electronic communications . . .
are an extension of the individual and the home. . . . [They] are closely tied to the privacies of
life or intimate activities that are traditionally associated with the home . . . and deserve
continued protection under the Fourth Amendment.”); Wendy K. Mariner, Reconsidering
Constitutional Protection for Health Information Privacy, 18 U Pa J Const L 975, 978 (2016)
(arguing that the dependence on sharing personal health information electronically should be
reflected in Fourth Amendment doctrine); Edina Harbinja, Legal Nature of Emails: A Com-
parative Perspective, 14 Duke L & Tech Rev 227 (2016) (arguing that email accounts “can be
analogized to the paper on which letters are written.”).
214 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning 10 (Yale, 1923) (Walter Wheeler Cook, ed) (articulating the juridical incidents (i.e.,
privileges, claims, powers, and immunities) embedded in the concept of a right).
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Consider freedom of movement. It is the right-holder’s exercise of
this freedom that generates location data, which would not exist but
for the individual’s actions: purchasing a mobile device, charging it,
turning it on, carrying it, and going to particular places at particular
times. If the individual did not have an original right to the infor-
mation, he or she could not contract to share it with an ISP. It would
not be hers to provide. However, it clearly is hers to provide.
Simultaneously, the right-holder has a claim on the company with
whom she contracts to provide communications in a timely, efficient,
and consistent manner. That is the whole point of having a mobile
device: to be able to use the telephone whenever and wherever one
chooses. This claim-right does not exist independent of the individual’s
contractual relationship with the company. The salient question is whether,
by providing it to the service provider, the right-holder somehow loses
her ownership interest in the information.215 Here, the law of bailment
and positive law may play an important role.
1. Bailment and contractual obligations. “[T]he fact that a third-
party has access to or possession of your papers and effects,” Justice
Gorsuch wrote in Carpenter, “does not necessarily eliminate your
interest in them.”216 Gorsuch’s insight is important. History and
precedent strongly support distinguishing between ownership and
possession in regard to property rights. English law has long favored
the former—a preference embedded in the concept of bailment.217
By the end of the Middle Ages, common law recognized a bailor’s
property interest in goods held by others.218 In such instances, an
215 In cases where an individual writes a letter (or email) and sends it to another person,
then the recipient would have the right to reveal the information. The government can only
gain access to the document via consent (of either the sender or the recipient) or a partic-
ularized warrant. The carrier, however, as the discussion that follows explains, is in a different
position: namely, bailment upon consideration.
216 Carpenter, 138 SCt at 2268 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting). It creates a bailment—that is, “delivery
of personal property by one person (the bailor), to another (the bailee), who holds the property
for a certain purpose.” Id, quoting and citing Black’s Law Dictionary 169 (West, 10th ed 2014).
See also Richard A. Lord, 19 Williston on Contracts § 53:1 (West, 4th ed Nov 2018 update) (“A
bailmentmay be defined as the rightful possession of goods by onewho is not the owner.”); James
Schouler, A Treatise on the Law of Bailments Including Pledge, Innkeepers and Carriers 2 n 2 (Little,
Brown, 1905) (defining bailment as “Adelivery of some chattel by one party to another, to be held
according to the special purpose of the delivery, and to be returned or delivered over when that
special purpose is accomplished.”). If the bailee, who has a legal duty to keep the property safe, fails
to do so or violates the bailor’s instructions, he is liable for conversion. Id at 2269. He cites state
cases:Goad vHarris, 207Ala 357, 92 So 546 (1922);Knight v Seney, 124NE813, 815–16 (Ill 1919);
Baxter v Woodward, 158 NW 137, 139 (Mich 1916).
217 Pollock and Maitland, 2 History of English Law at ∗152 (cited in note 28).
218 Id at ∗177.
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owner “deliver[ed] possession of his chattel to another,”219 altering
custody without transferring ownership.220 The bailee (temporarily)
held the property for some purpose (e.g., use, enjoyment, or safe-
keeping).221
Where the law shifted over time was in regard to liability, recovery,
and types of bailment. Thus Ranulf de Glanvill, Chief Justiciar under
Henry II, wrote in the twelfth century in the first recognized treatise
on English law that the commodatary (the bailee in a commodatus, see
discussion below) was held to strict liability.222 In the thirteenth
century, Bracton’s De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae took a less
aggressive stance, holding the depositary liable only in the case of
dolus—that is, deceit or bad faith.223 Due diligence, in some cases,
would be sufficient. In 1601, however, Edward Coke, the first lord
chief justice of England, essentially returned to Glanvill’s approach
when he examined a writ of detinue against a bailee from whom the
goods in question had been stolen by force.224 Coke, finding no dis-
tinction between the duty to keep chattel and to keep chattel safely,
held the bailee to a standard of strict liability for the items in his
possession.225
For the next century, Coke’s approach in Southcote’s case held. But
in 1703, Lord Chief Justice of England John Holt, drawing in part
from Roman law, repudiated Coke’s standard and laid down a series
of principles that formed the basis for the modern law of bailment.226
In 1781, the English juristWilliam Jones built uponHolt’s principles,
219 Id at ∗168. Bailment vests when content of chattels are made visible to bailee. Bowdon v
Pelleter, 17 YB 8 Edw II (41 Seldon Society) 136 (1315).
220 Pollock and Maitland, 2 History of English Law at ∗168 (cited in note 28).
221 See id at ∗169; Schouler, A Treatise on the Law of Bailments § 1 at 1 (cited in note 216).
222 Ranulf de Glanvill, Tractatus de legibus et Consuetudinibus Regni Anglie book 10, ch 13
(Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Kingdom of England ) (1554).
223 Henrici de Bracton, 2 De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (On the Laws and Customs of
England ) fol 99 b at 111 (Hein, 1990) (Travers Twiss, ed).
224 Southcote’s Case, 76 Eng Rep 1061 (KB 1601).
225 Id at 1062.
226 Coggs v Bernard, 92 Eng Rep 107, 110 (1703) (“[T]o shew that the tenor of the law was
always otherwise, I shall give a history of the authorities in the books in this matter, and by
them shew, that there never was any such resolution given before Southcote’s case.”). See also
William F. Elliott, A Treatise on the Law of Bailments and Carriers 3 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1914);
Thomas Beven, 2 Negligence in Law 746–48 (Stevens and Haynes, 3d ed 1908) (critiquing
Oliver Wendell Holmes’s sui generis understanding of English common law). But see Holmes,
The Common Law at 179–85 (cited in note 29) (generally supporting Coke).
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finding in the temporary nature of bailment a certain (albeit limited)
duty to the bailor.227 Like Holt, Jones considered different forms of
bailment based on the relationship between bailor and bailee.228
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story augmented Jones, cementing
the foundation for the contemporary era.229
Throughout this time, bailment was thought of as a type of con-
tractual relationship, even where no formal contract had been
signed.230 Simultaneously, it was not merely a right ex contractu; the
common law conveyed it.231 The bailee had possession, while the
bailor retained residual ownership rights.232
A number of implications followed. A bailor could sue in detinue to
recover chattel wrongfully detained.233 Although the bailee wasmerely
a custodian, he maintained remedies against anyone who tried to
disturb his possession.234 The bailee thus had something more than
227 William Jones, Essay on the Law of Bailments 5 (Nichols, 1781).
228 See id.
229 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Law of Bailments v–vii (Hilliard and Brown, 1832).
230 Id at 2 (“[A] bailment is a delivery of a thing in trust or some special object or purpose,
and upon a contract, expressed or implied, to conform to the object or purpose of the trust.”);
Henry John Stephen, 2 New Commentaries on the Laws of England (Partly Founded on
Blackstone) at 129 (John S. Voorhies, 1st Am ed 1843) (“Bailment . . . is delivery of goods for
some particular purpose, or on mere deposit, upon a contract express or implied, that, after
the purpose has been performed, they shall be re-delivered to the bailor, or otherwise dealt
with according to his directions.”); Edwin Charles Goddard, Outlines of the Law of Bailments
and Carriers § 1 at 1 (Callaghan, 1904) (“A bailment is a contract relation resulting from the
delivery of personal chattels by the owner, called the bailor, to a second person, called the
bailee, for a specific purpose, upon the accomplishment of which the chattels are to be dealt
with according to the owner’s direction.”); Elliot, A Treatise on the Law at 1 (cited in note 226)
(“A bailment may be defined as a contract by which the possession of personal property is
temporarily transferred from the owner to another for the accomplishment of some special
purpose.”).
231 See William K. Laidlaw, Principles of Bailment, 16 Cornell L Q 286, 287 (1931) (“Al-
though it is frequently said that bailment is founded upon contract, the actual decisions show
that it is not so founded.”). See also Alice Erh-Soon Tay, The Essence of a Bailment: Contract,
Agreement or Possession?, 5 Sydney L Rev 239, 239 (1966).
232 English law had long recognized these dual rights. See Bracton, 2 On the Laws and
Customs of England fol 103 b at 144–45 (Bracton wrote, “An action [vi bonorum raptorum], on
account of movables carried off by force or robbed, is allowed to the owner of a thing or to
him from whose custody they have been carried off and who has entered into contract of
payment in relation to their owner, so that he has an interest to bring the action.”) (cited in
note 223), cited and quoted in Bordwell, 29 Harv L Rev at 510 (cited in note 29). Pollock and
Maitland, 2 The History of English Law at ∗172 (cited in note 28) (“[T]he action of detinue is a
vindication based upon a proprietary right.”).
233 Id at ∗173. See also Samuel Stoljar, The Early History of Bailment, 1 Am J Legal Hist 5
(1957).
234 Pollock and Maitland, 2 The History of English Law at ∗170 (cited in note 28).
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mere possession: he had an interest in the property, and a responsi-
bility for its safety.235 The bailee and the bailor could go after a third
party to protect their interests.236 Bailment further distinguished
ownership not just from possession, but from the right to possess.237 As
theEnglish jurist Frederick Pollock and JusticeRobert SamuelWright
of the Queen’s Bench Division explained in the late nineteenth cen-
tury,
Right to possession (sometimes called constructive “possession,”) . . . is one
of the constituent elements of the complete right of property; though it
may be in a different person from the general owner, and though a person’s
right of property may continue during a temporary suspension of his right
to possession, as in the case of a bailment for a term. Being a part of the
right or property it is said not to be lost, even by a general abandonment of
the thing.238
Applied to CSLI, if we assume, arguendo, that digital records
ought to be treated in the same manner as goods or chattel, under a
theory of bailment, the fact that a company holds customer data does
not necessarily mean that the individual has alienated his property
interest in the record.239 Nor does an independent right of action by
the company against others who attempt to obtain the information
necessarily erase the underlying ownership interest. Even should
Verizon, for example, agree to let other companies useCSLI tomarket
235 Id at ∗169. See also Bracton, 2 On the Laws and Customs of England fol 151 (cited in
note 223), quoted and cited in both Pollock and Maitland, 2 The History of English Law at ∗169
(cited in note 28), and Holmes, The Common Law at 168 (cited in note 29); Federick Pollock
and Robert Samuel Wright, An Essay on Possession in the Common Law, Part 3 at 145 (Clarendon,
1888).
236 As the English Year Books related, “In these actions two rights may be concerned—the
right of possession, as is the case where a thing is robbed or stolen from the possession of one
who had no right of property in it (for instance, where the thing has been lent, bailed, or let);
and the right of property, as is the case where a thing is stolen or robbed from the possession
of one to whom the property in it belongs.” William Joseph Wittaker, ed, 7 Seldon Society
Publications: The Mirror of Justices 57 (Bernard Quaritch, 1895).
237 Pollock and Wright, An Essay on Possession in the Common Law at 145 (cited in note 235);
Pollock and Maitland, 2 The History of English Law at ∗151 (cited in note 28).
238 Pollock and Wright, An Essay on Possession in the Common Law at 145 (cited in note 235).
239 This is how the Federal Trade Commission treats data held by service providers. In
their case against Facebook, even though the company possessed the information, when
customers chose to leave the platform, they retained the right to delete their data. See
Complaint, In the Matter of Facebook, Inc., Docket No C-, File No 092 3184, online at https://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/11/111129facebookcmpt.pdf; Agreement
Containing Consent Order, In the Matter of Facebook, Inc., File No 092 3184, online at https://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/11/111129facebookagree.pdf.
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goods to the customer, as a categorical matter, the law of bailment
might still recognize the customer’s underlying property rights. As
long as the rights of ownership have not been sold in a market overt,
the owner retains residual rights. As Pollock and Maitland explained,
“the owner cannot be deprived of his ownership by any transaction
betweenother persons, even though hehas partedwith possession, and
for a time with the right to possess.”240
To ascertain whether the individual who carries a mobile device
retains an ownership interest in the record of his or her movements,
the relationship between the original rights-owner (i.e., the person
with the original right to contract with others to provide access to the
information) and the entity possessing the property requires further
scrutiny.
2. Digital records as a “bailment upon consideration.” Modern law
recognizes different kinds of relationships between bailor and bailee.
Although historically they carried differing levels of liability (for the
bailee), they did not alter the ownership interest. The court askedwhat
duty was owed by the one who possesses the goods. Among the kinds of
bailment recognized by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century treatise
writers, the ones most relevant to CSLI are included in bailment upon
consideration—specifically, contracts related to hiring.241 They sub-
240 Pollock and Maitland, 2 The History of English Law at ∗153 (cited in note 28).
241 By the eighteenth century, at least five kinds of bailment had come to be recognized in
common law. Jones, Essay on the Law of Bailments at 35 (cited in note 227); James Kent, 2
Commentaries on American Law 558 (O. Halsted, 2d ed 1832). In Coggs v Bernard, though,
Holt distinguished “six sorts of bailments,” which included depositum, commodatum; locatio
et conductio; vadium (pawn or pledge); delivery of goods or chattels to be transported for a
reward; and delivery of goods or chattels gratis. Coggs v Bernard, 92 Eng Rep 107, 109 (1703).
Depositam dealt with situations in which a deposit was made without reward for recovery.
Kent, 2 Commentaries on American Law at 560 (cited in note 241). In Coggs v Bernard, Lord
Holt established that only ordinary care and diligence is expected. Coggs, 92 Eng Rep at 110.
Mandatum amounted to a gratuitous commission, wherein “the mandatary undertakes to do some
act about the thing bailed.” Kent, 2 Commentaries on American Law at 558 (cited in note 241).
If the bailee were to transport movable goods, he was only responsible for gross negligence or
a breach of good faith. “But if he undertakes to perform some work relating to it, he is then
bound to use a degree of diligence and attention suitable to the undertaking and adequate to
the performance of it.” Id at 569–70. Commodatum was a loan for use without payment,
wherein the item was to be restored in specie (e.g., a horse, carriage, or book). The bailee had a
higher duty of care to return the same goods. Id at 446–49. Vadium was a pawn or pledge,
such as when something “is bailed to a creditor as a security for a debt.” Id at 437. The bailee
was required “to take ordinary care, and is answerable for ordinary neglect, and no more.” Id
at 449. Locatio, which entails “hiring for a reward,” is of three types: locatio rei (where the
bailee, in return for money, has temporary use of the item); locatio operis faciendi, in which
work and labor is done, or care and attention bestowed by the bailee on the materials bailed,
in return for compensation; and locatio operis mercium vehendarum (in which goods are bailed
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divide into bailments involving: (a) use of a thing (locatio rei), (b) work
on a thing (locatio operis faciendi), (c) the keeping of a thing (locatio cus-
todiae), and (d ) the transportation of an item (locatio operis mercium
vehendarum).242 How does CSLI look in this context? The strongest
argument places location data in the first category, while two others
provide further insight.
Just as telecommunication service providers only have access to
customers’ location while they are paying for the service, the bailee in
locatio rei “gains a qualified property in the thing hired, and the
[owner] an absolute property in the price.”243 Professor James Kent
observed, “This is a contract in daily use in the common business of
life.”244
As the Court in Riley and Carpenter was at pains to point out,
mobile phones have become a part of daily life. The owner of the
phone generates the data and signs a contract to provide it to others.
Customers pay for the service, giving companies temporary access to
their location, in return for which the customer is able to make use of
the mobile devices. Companies, in turn, are responsible for ensuring
that others do not gain access to the information. Failure to safeguard
the data creates a liability, not unlike the one established in locatio rei.
At no point does the company gain power over the individual’s
freedom of movement, generation of data, or authority to contract.
Once the agreement ends, the company no longer has access to the
(former) customer’s location. Nor could the company dictate with
whom future movements could be shared. In no sense has the ISP
gained the authority to alter the customer’s privileges or claims. No
to public carrier or private person or transport, in return for either a stipulated or implied re-
ward). Kent, 2 Commentaries on American Law at 558, 585–86 (cited in note 241). Modern
treatises classify bailments slightly differently. See Lord, 19 Williston on Contracts § 53:3 (cited in
note 216). The most recent American treatise on bailment, published in 1914, placed all bail-
ments in two categories: gratuitous bailments (i.e., for the benefit of one party) and bailments
upon consideration. Elliott, A Treatise on the Law at 4–5 (cited in note 226). Of the former, those
for the benefit of the bailor divide into deposits and mandates. Those for the benefit of the bailee
alone are considered commodates. Elliott, A Treatise on the Law at 4 (cited in note 226). Bailments
upon consideration for mutual benefit divide into two categories: vadium (pledges) and contracts
of hiring.
242 Elliott, A Treatise on the Law at 4–5 (cited in note 226). Locatio custodiae applies less
directly to CSLI, as it signifies the keeping of a specific item that is then returned to the
customer intact.
243 Kent, 2 Commentaries on American Law at 586 (cited in note 241).
244 Id.
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more so could the ISP itself collect future location data, without
express permission. The fact that a consumer has granted access for a
limited purpose (providing services) does nothing to divest the in-
dividual of her underlying privilege. To the contrary, the company’s
ability to obtain and use such records rests entirely on the original
claim-right exercised by the customer as against the company. It is a
bailment for consideration structured in a manner consistent with
locatio rei.
CSLI also shares characteristics with a second kind of bailment:
locatio operis faciendi, in which work is done, or care and attention
bestowed, by the bailee on the materials bailed, in return for com-
pensation. At least part of the service provided by telecommunications
companies relates to the use that is made of the records. Verizon
temporarily obtains the information, which it uses to provide better
services to its customers. Part of the advantage to the customer is that
in the future, calls will be provided more efficiently, with fewer gaps
in coverage. While not as complete an account as locatio rei, this ap-
proach takes account of potentially broader controls over how the in-
formation is used by the ISP.
Under a third kind of bailment for consideration, locatio operis
mercium vehendarum, goods are bailed to a public carrier, a private
person, or a transportation service, in return for either a stipulated
or implied reward. To the extent that modern telecommunications
companies carry communications, there is room for further consid-
eration. Postmasters, for example, historically fell within this cate-
gory, within which they had a higher duty of care—precisely because
of their relationship to the intimate details of individuals’ lives. This
was the logic adopted by the Court in Ex parte Jackson, where it held
that private papers were still protected “wherever they may be.”245 It
mattered naught that the government itself held the documents (qua
the postal service). When sealed from public inspection, letters fell
within constitutional protections.246
The divergent theories of liability that depend upon the position of
the bailor, as well as degrees of negligence, came to be replaced in the
245 Id, quoting Ex Parte Jackson, 96 US 727, 733 (1877).
246 Applying this approach to the contemporary era, Gorsuch wrote, “Just because you
entrust your data—in some cases, your modern-day papers and effects—to a third party may
not mean you lose any Fourth Amendment interest in its contents.” Carpenter, 138 S Ct at
2269.
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American context by a uniform negligence standard.247 Keeping in
mind concerns about data breaches, the duty placed on ISPs again is
remarkably consistent with the traditional responsibilities of a bail-
ment upon consideration. The categories shed light on the different
types of relationships contemplated by the law, in which residual
ownership rights have historically been maintained by the courts.
3. Points of convergence and divergence. In Carpenter, Justices Ken-
nedy and Alito largely agreed with Gorsuch in regard to digital docu-
ments qua property and the potential role of bailment in a digital age.
For Kennedy, “modern-day equivalents of an individual’s own ‘papers
or ‘effects’ . . . are held by a third-party” as a “bailment.”248 He con-
sidered such matters covered by the Fourth Amendment, even where
they might run afoul of third-party doctrine.249 The point of dis-
agreement was whether CSLI involved that sort of bailment.250 For
Kennedy, it did not: “The businesses were not bailees or custodians of
the records, with a duty to hold the records for the defendants’ use.”251
Justice Alito similarly noted that bailmentmay apply to certain types of
records entrusted to others, but not to CSLI.252
Their arguments are difficult to sustain in light of the structure of
bailment and how CSLI works. Their logic centered on the level of
control exhibited by the companies. Alito noted that Carpenter,
had no right to prevent the company from creating or keeping the infor-
mation in its records. [He] had no right to demand that the providers
destroy the records, no right to prevent the providers from destroying the
records, and, indeed, no right to modify the records in any way whatsoever
(or to prevent the providers from modifying the records). Carpenter, in
short, has no meaningful control over [CSLI].253
But the law of bailment recognizes that the possessor not only exer-
cises control over material so bailed, but also has a series of rights
247 Richard H. Helmholz, Bailment Theories and the Liability of Bailees: The Elusive Uniform
Standard of Reasonable Care, 41 Kan L Rev 97, 97 (1992). See also Sheldon D. Elliott, Degrees
of Negligence, 6 S Cal L Rev 91 (1933).
248 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2230 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).
249 Id (writing, “Miller and Smith may not apply when the Government obtains the modern-
day equivalents of an individual’s own ‘papers’ or ‘effects,’ even when those papers or effects are
held by a third-party.”).
250 Id.
251 Id at 2228 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).
252 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2259 n 6 (Alito, J, dissenting).
253 Id at 2257 (Alito, J, dissenting). See also id at 2228–29 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).
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related to that control. Indeed, to even be considered a bailee,Williston
on Contracts notes, “one must have both physical control of goods and
intent to exercise that control.”254 The bailment itself “depends on the
degree of control and possession, and there must be such a full trans-
fer, actual or constructive, of the property to the bailee as to exclude
the possession of the owner and all other persons and give the bailee
the sole custody and control of the goods.”255 In such circumstances,
though, it is “only possession of property” that is transferred.256 “[T]he
bailor remains the true owner.”257
It is not necessary to fully satisfy the ancient, or even modern, law
of bailment to recognize that it provides a solid, well-groundedway of
thinking about property in a digital era. Some forms of customer data
are only brought into being by a third party and do not rely on others’
actions for their existence. Others are unique to the customer, to which
the company has access. CSLI is of the second sort, in that it wholly
depends upon the customer’s decision to purchase a phone, the
customer’s use of his property, the customer’s movements, and the
customer’s decision to contract with a company to provide services—
to the customer. Even after providing location data, the customer is
free to share it with others through various apps. And once the
contract ends, the service provider no longer has the right to obtain
the information. Instead, the consumer decides where it will reside.
CSLI is in a different category from that of traditional police sur-
veillance. It is one intimately grounded in property rights.
b. the role and limits of positive law
InCarpenter, Justice Gorsuch emphasized that positive law (federal
and state) may play a role in helping to establish Fourth Amendment
interests.258 This, too, offers a promising approach for understanding
property rights in an advanced technological age.
Where federal statutory law or regulatory measures have privileged
certain actors’ control over information and denied access to the information
to others, government intrusions may constitute a search or seizure




258 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2270 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
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within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.259 This approach is
similar to a formulation offered by Professor William Baud and
Professor James Stern, who argue that the salient question for Fourth
Amendment purposes is “whether it was unlawful for an ordinary
private actor to do what the government’s agents did.”260 But it dis-
tinguishes between the privilege held by the right-holder and the duty
of noninterference placed on others. In doing so, it recognizes that it is
important first to acknowledge who holds the right of consent and,
second, whether the law establishes an expectation of security against
interference (based on the obligation on others not to access the in-
formation absent the right-holder’s consent).
This distinction is constitutionally meaningful. Where an indi-
vidual has a privileged position, such that they may grant (or with-
hold) access to the property in question, the law recognizes owner-
ship: in other words, these are “their” papers or effects. Similarly,
where private actors have been denied access absent the right-holder’s
consent, then the privilege owner’s security in relation to “their” papers
has been established. Should a private actor access the information
without the privilege-holder’s consent, it would be a violation of the
duty owed by the other party to the privilege-holder.
From this, it is logically consistent to conclude that should the
government try to access the same information, that security also
would be violated. Absent a special carve-out for an obligation owed
by the privilege-holder to the government, to the extent that the
privilege-holder has the right to security of their papers, it may be
said to set an expectation of security against all comers.
In fact, there may be an even higher burden that the government
must meet to gain access to information in which the privilege owner
has been granted security.261 The government, after all, has massive
resources and a monopoly on coercion backed by violence. It can
imprison people, take their money, forfeit their property, and even
259 Professors Baude and Stern offer a straightforward distinction between search and
seizure, which strikes me as correct: the former “requires an action generally likely to obtain
information,” while the latter “requires an assertion of physical control.” Baude and Stern,
129 Harv L Rev at 1833 (cited in note 205). As they observe, there must be a distinction—
otherwise the addition of “seizure” would be surplusage. Id at 1832–33.
260 Id at 1826.
261 See also Re, 129 Harv L Rev F at 314 (cited in note 205) (writing, “[G]overnment action
is different—and often more deserving of regulation—than similar conduct by private
parties.”).
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take their lives. Private actors (as a matter of law) cannot. The Fourth
Amendment itself places restrictions on the government in an effort
to restrict the exercise of power and, in so doing, to protect liberty.
Positive law thus may help to demarcate constitutional limits.
How does this look in the context of CSLI? Federal laws routinely
create rights in intangible things, thereby restricting private actors.262
The 1996 Telecommunications Act, for example, places a duty on
carriers “to protect the confidentiality of proprietary information of,
and relating to . . . customers.”263 The statute goes on to lay out the
confidentiality of customer proprietary network data, limiting its use,
disclosure, or access to the direct provision of services.264 As Gorsuch
noted in Carpenter, service providers cannot use, disclose, or give
others access to customer proprietary network information without
the consent of the customer, except as needed for ordinary business
purposes.265 They must provide it, when the customer requests, to
anyone designated by the customer.266 Where a company fails to pro-
tect customer data, the statute provides for a private cause of action.267
Surveying these measures, he concluded, “Plainly, customers have
substantial legal interests in this information, including at least some
right to include, exclude, and control its use. Those interests might
even rise to the level of a property right.”268
While federal statutory measures may provide the strongest evi-
dence in support of property rights (in regard to placing a duty of
noninterference on others—including, arguendo, the government),
state laws also may be probative. Where states have taken certain
steps to establish property rights, acknowledging a privilege held by
the rights-holder, the courts should at least consider suchmeasures in
their analysis. This approach may help to identify constitutional
limits on doctrines ill-suited to the digital age.
262 Health care providers, for instance, are required to protect all “individually identifiable
health information” relating to an individual’s past, present, or future physical or mental
health or condition, in any media in which it is held. Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-191, §§ 262, 110 Stat 1936, 2021, 2023, 2029–30.
263 47 USC § 222(a).
264 47 USC § 222(c)(1).
265 Carpenter, 138 S Ct 2272 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting), citing 47 USC § 222(c)(1).
266 Carpenter, 138 S Ct 2272, citing 47 USC § 222(c)(2).
267 Carpenter, 138 S Ct 2272, citing 47 USC § 207.
268 Carpenter, 138 S Ct 2272.
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Consider open space doctrine. Many states have responded to the
privacy invasions occasioned by Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) by
extending trespass laws to include the airspace above the land.269
California forbids “constructive trespass” onto private property, which
does not require physical entry into the airspace above private property
for a right of action.270 It is illegal “to capture any type of visual image,
sound recording, or other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging
in a private, personal, or familial activity.”271Not only is the personwho
conducts the constructive trespass liable for punitive damages, but also
anyone who “directs, solicits, actually induces, or actually causes an-
other person, regardless of whether there is an employer-employee
relationship” to commit the offense.272
These and myriad similar state provisions suggest an outer limit
to open space doctrine, extending property rights to the constructive
trespass of the airspace above private land and placing a duty of non-
interference on others—thus protecting the property owners’ enjoy-
ment of their land. While not conclusive, such measures surely are at
least probative in understanding the associated property rights when
the same restrictions are violated by the government.
This may be particularly true when state provisions expressly forbid
state and local governments from interferingwith property rights.More
than eighteen states, for instance, require that law enforcement obtain
a warrant before using UAS as part of their investigatory powers.273
Where data are collected outside of a warrant, most states include a
suppression remedy.274 Some go so far as to allow for a civil cause of
action against officials, with significant penalties for the dissemination
269 See, for example, Cal Civ Code § 1708.8(a); La Rev Stat Ann § 14:63; Nev Rev Stat
§ 493.103(1); Or Rev Stat § 837.380(1); Tenn Code Ann § 39-14-405(d). See also Laura K.
Donohue, A Tale of Two Sovereigns: Federal and State Use and Regulation of Unmanned Aircraft
Systems, in Kimon P. Valavanis and George J. Vachtsevanos, eds, Handbook of Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (Springer, 2d ed forthcoming 2020), online at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_idp2943018.
270 Cal Civ Code § 1708.8(b). See also NC Gen Stat § 15A-300.1(b).
271 Cal Civ Code § 1708.8(a).
272 Cal Civ Code § 1708.8(e).
273 See, for example, Alaska Stat Ann § 18.65.901(1); Fla Stat § 934.50(3)(b); Idaho Code
§ 21-213(2)(a); 725 ILCS 167/15(2); Ind Code § 35-33-5-9(a); 25 Me Rev Stat Ann § 4501(4)
(B); Mont Code Ann § 46-5-109(1); Nev Rev Stat § 493.112(2); Or Rev Stat §§ 837.310,
837.320; Va Code § 19.2-60.1(B).
274 See, for example, Nev Rev Stat § 493.112(4); Tenn Code Ann § 39-13-609(e)(2).
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of material obtained via warrantless surveillance. In North Carolina,
the target of the surveillance is entitled to $5,000 for every photograph
or video illegally disseminated by any government agency or em-
ployee.275 States also forbid and/or tightly regulate UAS use of bio-
metric identification technologies, infrared imaging, video analytics,
and enhanced visual aids.276
More specifically, in regard to CSLI, some states preclude law
enforcement from accessing information generated by electronic
devices without proper legal process. The 2015 California Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA) creates a property right in
digital assets, that is, digitally stored content and online accounts,
such as photographs, text messages, postings, spreadsheets, word docu-
ments, email, and myriad other digital formats and their associated
metadata.277 Lawmakers introduced the statute to curb ballooning
law enforcement requests for commercial third-party records.278
Looking to state law to establish property rights (and thereby
gauge constitutional entitlements) is consistent with the Court’s ju-
risprudence. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments refer to “prop-
erty,” but the Constitution says nothing about whether ownership
rights exist, much less their scope.279 Courts make this determination
by looking to state and local law.280 Regulatory takings determinations
turn on two sources: the state’s property law, and the reasonable
expectations of owners as “shaped by the State’s law of property—i.e.,
whether and to what degree the State’s law has accorded legal rec-
275 NC Gen Stat § 15A-300.1(e).
276 See, for example, 20 Vt Stat Ann § 4622(d)(2); 25 Me Rev Stat Ann § 4501(5)(D).
277 California Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 2015 Cal Stat 5110, codified at Cal
Penal Code § 1546 et seq.
278 See SB 178 Fact Sheet (Leno and Anderson) (ACLU of Northern California, Sept 2,
2015), online at https://www.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/SB%20178%20CalECPA%20Fact
%20Sheet_1.pdf (noting, inter alia, a 70 percent increase for location data from AT&T
within the past year and a 52 percent increase in requests to Twitter).
279 See US Const, Amend V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of . . . property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion.”); US Const, Amend XIV (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of . . . property,
without due process of law.”). See also Phillips v Washington Legal Foundation, 524 US 156,
164 (1998) (holding that the Fifth Amendment protects but does not create property
interests), quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v Roth, 408 US 564, 577 (1972).
280 United States v Powelson, 319 US 266, 279 (1943) ( Justice Douglas writing for the Court,
noting that although “the meaning of ‘property’ as used in . . . the Fifth Amendment is a
federal question, it will normally obtain its content by reference to local law.” See also United
States v Causby, 328 US 256, 266 (1946), quoting and citing Powelson).
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ognition and protection” to the property owner’s interests.281 Even
states may not avoid confiscatory regulations takings claims by dis-
avowing property interests historically recognized under their laws.282
The query is not limited to economic value. As an annotation from
the American Law Reports explains, it incorporates “a group of rights
that a so-called owner exercises in his or her domination of [the item],
such as the right to possess, use, and dispose of it.”283
The Court’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence
underscores the importance of the protections extended to property.284
What is included may expand over time: liberty and property “relate
to the whole domain of social and economic fact, and the statesmen
who founded this Nation knew too well that only a stagnant society
remains unchanged.”285 Liberty means not just “freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge,
to marry, establish a home . . . to worship God according to the dic-
tates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men.”286
As a matter of Fourth Amendment doctrine, positive law may create
a floor, but not a ceiling, for constitutional rights.287 Once the law has
established a privilege in the right-holder and placed a duty of nonin-
terference on others, it is for the government to demonstrate that it has
the right to violate security of property. But a heavier burden may be
on them, in light of their particular position of power over the people.
281 Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 1016 n 7 (1992). See also id at 1027.
282 Phillips, 524 US at 167, citing id at 1029.
283 Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, What Constitutes Taking of Property Requiring Compensation
Under Takings—Supreme Court Cases; 10 ALR Fed 2d 231, 257 (2006).
284 See Board of Regents of State Colleges, 408 US at 571 (“‘Liberty’ and ‘property’ are broad
and majestic terms. They are among the ‘(g)reat (constitutional) concepts . . . purposely left to
gather meaning from experience’”), quoting National Mutual Insurance Co. v Tidewater Transfer
Co., 337 US 582, 646 (Frankfurter, J, dissenting).
285 Board of Regents of State Colleges, 408 US at 571.
286 Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390, 399 (1923).
287 I agree here with Professor Re, who proposes that the Court learn from how legislatures
treat private parties without being limited by them: “[W]hen the law has made a deliberate
choice to protect against certain intrusions on privacy and security by private parties, then
police should have to adduce some kind of justification for undertaking a similar intrusion.”
See Re, 129 Harv L Rev F at 313 (cited in note 205). Accordingly, I disagree with Professors
Baude and Stern who see the positive law inquiry as a ceiling, not a floor. See Baude and
Stern, 129 Harv L Rev at 1888 (cited in note 205).
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Elected representatives, of course, do not hold the final determi-
nation of constitutional protections. That falls to the judiciary. As
Justice Scalia declared in Jones, “wemust ‘assur[e] preservation of that
degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted.’”288 In Carpenter, Gorsuch agreed, noting
that Ex parte Jackson reflected this principle. He explained that in
Jackson,
this Court said that “[n]o law of Congress” could authorize letter carriers
“to invade the secrecy of letters.” So the post office couldn’t impose a
regulation dictating that thosemailing letters surrender all legal interests in
them once they’re deposited in a mailbox. If that is right, Jackson suggests
the existence of a constitutional floor below which Fourth Amendment
rights may not descend.289
Congress is constitutionally prohibited from granting warrantless
access to houses or papers, absent cause.290
In addition to helping to secure rights guaranteed at the founding,
adapting them to modern times, and providing a standard consistent
with judicial precedent, appealing to positive law to gauge property
rights for Fourth Amendment purposes has at least three policy ad-
vantages. First, it offers clarity.Where relevant laws have been adopted,
the Court can look to them as part of their calculus. Second, it helps
to insulate the courts from policy-making, freeing them to focus on
matters of law. The Court’s prior refusal to take account of statutory
law in determining what society considers more or less reasonable
resulted in contradictory and counterintuitive results that continue to
undermine judicial credibility. Just as it was illegal in California in the
1980s to cross fences or to trawl through a neighbor’s trash, it is now
illegal to obtain digital assets, or to record what happens on private
land, evenwhen the recording takes place outside the property line and
in public view. Third, the positive law approach acknowledges the role
played by the legislature in responding to new and emerging tech-
nologies. This was one of the dissents’ primary concerns in Carpen-
288 United States v Jones, 565 US 400, 406 (2012), quoting Kyllo v United States, 533 US 27,
34 (2001), cited in Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2271 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting). See also Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v Mahon, 260 US 393, 413 (1922) (“The greatest weight is given to the judgment of
the legislature but it always is open to interested parties to contend that the legislature has
gone beyond its constitutional powers.”).
289 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2270, quoting Ex parte Jackson, 96 US 727, 733 (1877).
290 See Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2271.
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ter.291 ForKennedy, “The last thing theCourt should do is incorporate
an arbitrary and outside limit—in this case six days’ worth of cell-site
records—and use it as the foundation for a new constitutional
framework.”292 Asking whether positive law establishes a privilege,
however, and whether there is a duty of noninterference—and using
this as probative as to whether a property right (as held against the
government) exists—is a very different kind of exercise, and one en-
tirely compatible with the dissents’ view that it is relevant to, but not
dispositive of, the property interests at stake.293
V. The Way Forward
In 1910 Sir Winston Churchill inveighed: “Let us . . . go
forward together. Advance with courage, and the cause of the people
shall prevail.”294 Such is the moment at which we stand, that the
Court simply must find a way to ensure, at a minimum, the rights that
were guaranteed by the Constitution at the founding. How, then,
should we think about digitization and the Fourth Amendment going
forward?295
Voluntariness and assumption of risk do not have a central role to
play. The application of open space doctrine to location tracking
rested on a faulty analogy. Unlike cars, mobile devices follow you into
the home. The approach ignored the impact of new technologies on
rights—in contrast to the Court’s recognition in Jones, Riley, and
Carpenter of the deeper privacy interests at stake. Other citizens,
moreover, cannot track you twenty-four hours a day, sevendays aweek,
291 See, for example, id at 2261 (Alito, J, dissenting); id at 2233 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).
292 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2233 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).
293 See, for example, id at 2242–43 (Thomas, J, dissenting); id at 2227–28 (Kennedy, J,
dissenting).
294 Sir Winston Churchill, The Lords and the Budget, in Robert Rhodes James, ed, Churchill
Speaks: Winston S. Churchill in Peace and War Collected Speeches, 1897–1963, at 185, 189
(Chelsea House, 1980) (speech given at the Manchester Free Trade Hall on Mar 19, 1910).
295 Since Carpenter, courts have exempted prior, warrantless collection based on good faith,
exigent circumstances, and reliance on binding precedent. See United States v Joyner, 899 F3d
1199, 1204–05 (11th Cir 2018); United States v Chavez, 894 F3d 593, 608 (4th Cir 2018);
United States v Curtis, 901 F3d 846, 848 (7th Cir 2018); United States v Zodhiates, 901 F3d 137,
143 (2d Cir 2018); United States v Chambers, 2018 WL 4523607, ∗1–2 (2d Cir), rem’d from
Chambers v United States, 138 S Ct 2705 (2018) (mem). But see United States v Thompson, 866
F3d 1149 (10th Cir 2017), vac’d and rehearing granted by Thompson v United States, 138 S
Ct 2706 (mem) (2018); United States v Stimler, 864 F3d 253 (3d Cir 2017), vac’d and re-
hearing granted by United States v Goldstein, 902 F3d 411 (3d Cir) (mem).
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for years. If they did, it would be downright creepy. And however
much an individual uses technology does not mean that others can see
it: from network security and encryption to the use of passwords and
consent clauses, users protect their data in myriad ways.
The assumption of risk and voluntariness argument drawn from
informant doctrine also falls short. This approach, which formed the
core of third-party doctrine, decimated constitutional protections
extended to papers. It ignored the difference between engaging in
illegal activity and forming legal, contractual relationships. It (erro-
neously) equated consenting to give a company access to one’s per-
sonal information with consenting to give the government access.
And it assumed that not using a bank or having a telephone were
viable options in the modern world. As the Court noted in Riley and
emphasized again in Carpenter, mobile devices are not voluntary.
Ordinary citizens cannot go through their day without encountering
Amazon, much less phones or computers.296 Any effort by the Courts
to parse which devices or apps are more or less voluntary will put the
judiciary ever more firmly in the policy-making realm, risking future
public confidence.
Amore promising approach going forward is for the Court to adopt
a property-based approach, which, happily, is compatible with both
precedent and the original meaning of the text. Digital documents
and records constitute “papers” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, such that their warrantless acquisition and analysis is
per se unreasonable.297 This approach applies the rule of functional
296 See Kashmir Hill, I Tried to Block Amazon from My Life: It Was Impossible (Gizmodo,
Jan 22, 2019), online at https://gizmodo.com/i-tried-to-block-amazon-from-my-life-it-was
-impossible-1830565336.
297 In Carpenter, Justices Kennedy and Alito considered compulsory process to support Miller,
Smith, and third-party doctrine. For Kennedy, the reason that the government could use a sub-
poena to compel individuals to release information within their control was because it differed
“from a warrant in its force and intrusive power.” Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2228 (Kennedy, J, dis-
senting). He explained: “While a warrant allows the Government to enter and seize and make
the examination itself, a subpoena simply requires the person to whom it is directed to make the
disclosure.” Kennedy’s argument was not strictly accurate. In requesting 128 days of records,
the government sought all location data on the target, not just one discrete piece of information.
Once served with a § 2703(d) order, the companies were forced to comply. Additionally, in the
1946 case of Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v Walling, the Supreme Court established that the
Fourth Amendment applies to the compelled production of documents. See Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. v Walling, 327 US 186 (1946). Orders must “be sufficiently limited in scope,
relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably
burdensome.” Donovan v Lone Steer, Inc., 464 US 408, 415 (1984), quoting See v City of Seattle,
387US 541, 544 (1967). See alsoCarpenter, 138 SCt at 2228 (Kennedy, J, dissenting); id at 2255
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equivalence, already adopted in regard to “houses,” to another, enu-
merated category.298 It recognizes that while digitization has altered
the world in which we live, it has not impacted guaranteed rights. In
Carpenter, the Court balked at leaving individuals “at the mercy of
advancing technology.”299 As Gorsuch observed, it is not just “the
specific rights known at the founding” that come within Fourth
Amendment protections, but also “their modern analogues.”300
To the extent that the factors employed by the Court to evaluate
CSLI (e.g., its volume, revealing nature, retroactivity, near perfect
recall, temporal extent, and precision) are relevant, it is not in making
some sort of relativistic determination, but in illustrating the extent to
which digital records reveal the same intimacies of life traditionally
protected under the Fourth Amendment. This approach is consistent
with Riley and Jones, where the Court recognized the revelatory nature
of the information at stake.While probative in terms of whether digital
documents or records are included in “papers,” however, the degree of
invasiveness is neither necessary nor sufficient. The Court does not
rest constructive search on the quality of information: in Kyllo, it did
not matter whether measuring heat levels revealed the type of “inti-
macies of life” traditionally protected. It was the government’s access
to anything in the home—including information that allowed it to draw
inferences—that constituted a violation. The Court took the same
position in Karo.
Instead, in determining who owns digital records, the Court should
consider adopting a but for approach: where the underlying data arise
from the actions of an individual, and that person has the original legal
right to determine whether and with whom it is shared, they hold an
ownership interest in it. This provides a clear line. For situations in-
volving third parties, the law of bailment upon consideration offers a
way to distinguish between ownership and possession and to evaluate
whether the owner has divested himself of the right of ownership.
(Alito, J, dissenting). CSLI reveals much more than the information being sought, and the
Court has never held that a subpoena can elicit records in which the suspect has a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Id at 2221 (majority). See also id at 2271 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting) (es-
tablishing as his fifth proposition that a constitutional floor may prevent efforts to circumvent
Fourth Amendment requirements through subpoenas).
298 See United States v Karo, 468 US 705, 715 (1984), and Kyllo v United States, 533 US 27,
34 (2001).
299 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2214.
300 Id at 2271 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
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To the extent that positive law recognizes and protects the right of
ownership, it speaks to a constitutional minimum. Here, courts should
look to the establishment of a privilege in the right-holder and the
corresponding duty held by private citizens—and, by extension, the
government—to noninterference absent consent or appropriate (con-
stitutional) process. This approach draws attention to the requirements
of ownership (in “their” papers) and security, restoring rights secured
at the founding. It adapts the Fourth Amendment to the modern age.
And it is consistent with Katz, which recognized property interests
and suggested that societal expectations matter—in this case, as ac-
knowledged by legislators. Beyond this, it offers clarity and insulates
judges frommaking policy determinations, allowing them to focus on
matters of law, even as it takes account of judicial concerns that the
legislature play a role in mediating new technologies. In sum, as the
Court develops its jurisprudence post-Carpenter, it should consider
acknowledging the gravitational force of the original Fourth Amend-
ment in protecting essential rights in a digital age.
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